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How to Prove a Rule of Customary International Criminal Law: Re-imaging a 
Definition of CIL 
 





The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 2  has been heralded as an 
indication that the international community has began to take the punishment of 
international crime seriously. 3    There has been little in the way of prosecution for 
international crime since Nuremburg.4  However, the last decade has seen a flurry of 
judicial activity on the international plane.5  This increasing jurisprudence necessitates an 
examination of the role of customary international criminal law.     
 
                                                 
1 Plato, Crito.  Edited by Emlyn-Jones (Bristol Classical: London, 1999) 
2 International Criminal Court was created by the: ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, UN.  
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17th July 1998), adopted on the 17th July 1998 at the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
3 Powell & Pillay, ‘Revisiting Pinochet: The Development of Customary International Criminal Law’ 17 
SAJHR (2001) 477 at 478.  For the question of whether a duty to prosecute under international criminal law 
see: Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ 59 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1996) 9; Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime’ 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) 2537. 
4 Tomuschat, ‘International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed’ 5 Criminal 
Law Forum (1994) 237 at 238.  The exception to this assertion is the Eichmann case.  A.G Israel –v- 
Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem); A.G Israel –v- Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 277 
(Israel Supreme Court).   
5 See Charney, ‘Progress in International Criminal Law?’ 93 AJIL (1999) 452. This judicial activity was 
first marked by the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).   The ICTY was 
established in 1993 by the Security Council in Res 827 (May 25th, 1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1203 (1993).  
The ICTR was established by Security Council Res 955 (Nov 8th 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994).  
For a discussion of the work of the ad hoc Tribunals see: Akhavan, ‘Contributions of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the Development of Definitions of Crimes 
against Humanity and Genocide’ 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (2000) 279; Cisse, ‘Symposium: Prosecuting 
International Crimes: An Inside View, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: 
Some Elements of Comparison’ 7 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1997) 107;  Kolb, ‘The 
Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals on their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes’ 
71 BYIL (2000)259; Meron, ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law’ 88 
AJIL (1994) 78 
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It is certainly true to say that international criminal law constitutes a distinct 
species of international law. 6   Criminal law, by its very nature, is constraining and 
descending law.7 International law, under an orthodox positivist conception, is centred 
upon notions of state sovereignty and is ascending law. 8   Within the realm of 
international criminal law, these two divergent conceptions of law are quite crudely 
juxtaposed and, thus, a degree of tension is inherent within international criminal law.9  
Consequently, customary international criminal law norms tend to be stated without any 
form of empirical enquiry. 10   Would re-imagining the definition of customary 
international law (CIL) ease this apparent tension?11
CIL, as articulated in Article 38(1) (b) of the ICJ Statute, is plagued by 
definitional uncertainties.  Article 38(1) (b) details custom as ‘evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law’ and has been described as ‘axiomatic’ by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).12  Most theorists maintain that there are two constituent elements 
of CIL: state practice and opinio juris (sense of legal obligation). 13   However, 
                                                 
6 Cassese, ‘International Criminal Law’ (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003) at 16. 
7Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (Lakimiesliiton 
Kustannus: Helsinki, 1989) at 40; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 489.  I borrow the terms - ‘descending’, 
‘constraining’ and ‘ascending’ from Powell & Pillay, ibid.  I use the term ‘descending’ law to refer to rules 
that are vertically applicable in nature.  In effect, norms that move from the rule downwards and restrict 
behaviour.  ‘Constraining’ refers to the fact that rules of criminal law are proscriptive in nature.  
‘Ascending’ law, on the other hand, refers to norms that moves upwards and bind states in a horizontal 
manner.   
8 See Carty, ‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’ 2 EJIL (1990) 
210; Koskenniemi, ibid at 362; Powell & Pillay, ibid at 490.  
9Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law’ 92 Am. Soc’y Int’ L. Proc. 
(1998) 44; Powell & Pillay ibid.  Charlesworth discusses this tension without specific reference to 
international criminal law. However, I would maintain, as do Powell & Pillay, that the tension is even more 
apparent within the realm of international criminal law. 
10 Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ 87 AJIL (1993) 529 at 537; D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary 
International Law’ 81 AJIL (1987) 101; Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ 1 EJIL (1990) 4 
at 27; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 497.  
11 I use the term ‘re-imagine’ to indicate that I intend to form a completely new picture of a definition of 
CIL beyond the strictures of the present understanding of the concept and furthermore, to speculate on the 
possible application of such a novel definition.  I use the term to indicate that I intend to do more than 
simply re-define or re-interpret the traditional definition.  
12  Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya/Malta) ICJ Reports 1985, pg 13 at pg 
20 para 27. It is noteworthy, that Article 38 is identical to a provision in the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ).  The Statute of the PCIJ was drafted in 1920 by an Advisory Committee of 
Jurists selected by the League of Nations.  See, Charlesworth, ‘Customary International Law and the 
Nicaragua Case’ 11 Aust. YBIL (1984-1987) 1 at 2.  
13 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Denmark/Federal Republic of Germany), ICJ Reports 1969, pg 3 at 
pg 29 para 37.  See, Bernhardt, ‘Customary International Law’ EPIL 898 at 899; Byers, ‘Power, Obligation 
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disagreement exists between ‘traditional’ conceptions of CIL – which assert the 
importance of state practice – and ‘modern’ approaches to CIL, which advocate the 
supremacy of opinio juris.14 Straddling these divergent doctrines is the contention that in 
reality there is no distinction between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ approaches.15
Despite these seemingly distinct doctrines, arguments surrounding the formation 
of CIL are universally circulatory.16 Whilst language by its very nature is ambiguous, it is 
apparent that any definition should be able to ‘exclude official interpretations that are 
evasions made in bad faith.’ 17  
CIL serves and can be manipulated by many masters because its elements, state 
practice and opinio juris, have no ascertainable meaning and are routinely 
ignored.18    
 
Some theorists have predicted the ultimate demise of CIL on the international 
plane.19  Such theorists advocate treaty law, the seemingly more reliable form of norm 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Customary International Law’ 11 Duke J. Comp. & int’l L (2001) 81 at 83; Charney, supra note 10 at 
536; Elias, ‘The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law’ 44 ICLQ (1995) 501; 
Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 362; Kunz, ‘The Nature of Customary International Law’  47 AJIL (1953) 
662 at 665; MacGibbon, ‘Customary International Law and Acquiescence’ 33 BYIL (1957) 115 at 117;  
Paust, ‘Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States’ 12 Mich. 
J. Int’l L (1990-1991) 59 at 61; Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation’ 95 American Journal of International Law (2001) 757.    This view of custom is 
not universal see: Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Customary 
Law?’ 5 Indian J Int L (1965) 23.  Cheng states, at 36: ‘International customary law has in reality only one 
constitutive element, the opinio juris.’  
14 I borrow the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ from Roberts, ibid.  For a discussion of ‘traditional’ 
approaches to CIL see: Charlesworth, supra note 12; Thirlway, International Customary Law and its 
Codification (A. W. Sijthoff: Leiden, 1972). For the modern approach to CIL see: Gunning, ‘Modernizing 
Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights’ 31 Va. J. Int’l L. (1990-1991) 211; Kirgis, 
‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ 81 American Journal of International Law (1987) 146. 
15 See, Koskenniemi, supra note 7. 
16Kennedy details this circular reasoning as a ‘disciplinary hamster wheel’.  See Kennedy, ‘When Renewal 
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’ 32 N.Y.U J. Int’ L.& Pol (2000) 335 at 407.  See, Byers, Custom, 
Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1999) at 136; Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 363; Powell & Pillay supra note 
3 at 495; Roberts, supra note 13 at 767. 
17 Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2001) at 106. 
18 Kelly, ‘The Twilight of Customary International Law’ 40 Va. J. Int’l L. (1999-2000) 449 at 459. 
19 See Charlesworth, supra note 12; Dunbar, ‘The Myth of Customary International Law’ 1993 Aust. YB 
Int’l L 1; Kelly, ibid. 
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formulation, as the pre-eminent source of international law. 20   In fact, Reisman has 
termed reliance on CIL as a ‘great leap backwards.’21  Much of this concern is directly 
related to the definitional uncertainties beleaguering the formation and application of CIL 
norms.  It is arguable that re-casting the definition of CIL will serve to allay these fears.    
Can a definition of CIL be exacted to prevent the marginalization of customary 
international criminal law norms?  If so, how does one prove a rule of customary 
international criminal law?  
In Chapter One, I intend to examine the development of CIL and delimit the 
parameters of the traditional doctrine.  In doing so, I hope to highlight the difficulties in 
its application in the area of international criminal law.  In Chapter Two, I will 
contemplate the modern theories of CIL and illustrate the circular nature of both the 
modern and traditional doctrines.  In Chapter Three, I will re-imagine a definition of CIL 
that attempts to break this circulatory reasoning.  In Chapter Four, I will detail the 
application of customary international criminal law norms both domestically and 
internationally. In particular, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals serves as an 
indicator of the possible shortcomings of the definition of CIL and is illustrative of the 
dangers of defective application of the definition as it currently stands. By way of 
conclusion, I intend to examine how, under my re-imagined definition of CIL, the 
international and domestic judiciary should prove a rule of customary international 
criminal law.  In doing so, I hope to illustrate that a workable definition of CIL is a real 





                                                 
20 See Gamble, ‘The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview 16 Tex Int’l L.J (1989) 305; Gunning, supra 
note 14 at 213. 
21 Reisman, ‘The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century’ 17 California Western International Law 
Journal (1987) 133 at 135.   
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CHAPTER ONE: The Formation of CIL: The Traditional Conception. 
  
i)  Distinguishing Customary International Law 
 
Traditional conceptions of international law - engendering consent-based theories - still 
have a significant influence and weight on the international plane.22  Whilst traditional 
definitions of international law are increasingly challenged, this challenge largely 
emanating from the demands of the human rights movement and an ever increasing 
number of international actors, the traditional doctrines have maintained their pre-
eminent role.23  It is a necessity to detail the specifics of the traditional doctrine of CIL, 
in order successfully to evaluate the assessment of the role of state practice and opinio 
juris in the traditional bi-partite doctrine.     
 
Firstly, it is essential to distinguish CIL norms and treaty-based obligations.24 The 
difference appears to lie in the manner in which and whom these norms bind.  Treaty-
based obligations bind only those states that have explicitly consented to be bound and 
thus, their application does not appear to challenge traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty.25  A lack of explicit consent is not a bar to the formation of CIL norms and 
once they are established as legal rules, such norms bind states generally.26 However, for 
CIL to retain its veracity in the more traditional, consensual based, theories of 
international law, its application is often tempered by the persistent objector rule.27   
                                                 
22 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 3; Weil, ‘Towards a Relative Normatavity in International Law? 77 AJIL 
(1983) 413 at 420.  
23 Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Claredon Press: Oxford, 1986) at 401; Charney, supra 
note 10 at 543. 
24 It is noteworthy that jurists have discussed whether Article 38 is designed to create a hierarchy between 
the sources of international law.  This discussion centres upon whether treaty norms or customary norms 
can be said to be of greater importance than the other.   Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 2.  For a discussion 
of  the hierarchy of sources in international law see, Akehurst, ‘Hierarchy of Sources of International law’ 
47 BYIL (1974-75) 273.   
25 D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary International Law’ 81 AJIL (1987) 101 at 103; Gunning, supra note 14 
at 213. For a discussion of treaty based obligations see: Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2000); Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International: The Hague, 1998).   
26 Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’47 BYIL (1974-1975) 1 at 23; Charlesworth, supra 
note 12 at 3, Charney, supra note 10 at 536; Gunning, ibid; Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 343.  
27 For a discussion of the persistent objector rule see: Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the 
Development of Customary International Law’ 56 BYIL (1986) 1; Charney, supra note 10; Colson, ‘How 
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CIL is seen as a means of compensating for the apparent inflexibility of treaty-
based obligations and as a method of legal regulation of legislative lacunae.28  However, 
some theorists are scathing of the rationale behind favouring the application of CIL 
norms over that of treaty-based obligations.29   Reisman terms CIL a ‘slogan’30  and 
further states that: ‘No one, I submit, seriously believes that custom is replacing 
deliberate international legislation.’31 It is possible, I would maintain, for CIL and treaty-
based obligations to co-exist in the international arena, without CIL norms becoming a 
merely epiphenomenal phenomenon.32  A re-casting of the definition of CIL will serve to 
facilitate a harmonious co-existence between treaty-based obligations and customary 
norms. 
 
Despite misgivings regarding the value of CIL as a source of international law, its 
role in norm-creation appears to be cemented. 33   As previously asserted, Article 38 
                                                                                                                                                 
Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?’ 61 Wash. L. Rev (1986) 957; Stein, ‘The Approach of the 
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law’ 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1985) 481. The persistent objector rule provides that if a State has objected to 
the establishment of a customary norm, whilst in its formative stage, the State is not bound by the emerging 
customary rule.  However, the rule is rarely invoked in practice and its validity is doubted by legal 
theorists.  Moreover, it is thought that a state cannot persistently object to a jus cogens norm.  See Charney, 
supra note 10 at 538. The ICJ has referred to the persistent objector rule (but only in dicta) in: Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries cases (UK –v- Norway) ICJ Reports 1951at 116, at 19 – ‘In any event the 10-mile 
rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to 
apply it to the Norwegian coast.’ and the Asylum case (Columbia –v- Peru) ICJ Reports 1950 at 266, at pg 
15 – ‘But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain Latin American States 
only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the 
contrary, repudiated it.’  Moreover, the application of the persistent objector rule is far from simple.  First 
and foremost, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the exact date that CIL norms become binding 
law.  The principle also seems conflict with the principle that ‘new’ states, upon entering the international 
legal arena, are bound by CIL norms regardless of their opposition.   See, Akehurst, supra note 24 at 27; 
Charney, supra note 10 at 538; Kelly, supra note 18 at 499.   It is noteworthy, that the persistent objector 
will have no role in my re-imagined definition of CIL. 
28 Charlesworth, supra note 9 at 44. 
29 See Dunbar, supra note 19; Kelly, supra note 18; Reisman, supra note 21. 
30 Reisman, ibid at 142. 
31 Ibid at 135 
32 This seems to be endorsed by the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua –v- USA) (Merits) case ICJ Reports 1986, at pg 84 para 177. See Gamble, 
supra note 20 at 307. 
33 Some jurists argue this role is cemented due to the need for customary international law norms to 
regulate human rights obligations.  See, Lillich, ‘The Growing Importance of Customary International 
Human Rights Law’ 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L (1995-1996) 1; Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Norms as Customary Law (Claredon Press: Oxford, 1989) at 80. 
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constitutes the starting point for any discussion of the delimitation of CIL norms. 34   
Within the traditional bi-partite doctrine, opinio juris serves to distinguish CIL norms 
from mere behavioural patterns.35  Despite this extra subjective requirement, all non-
written norms tend to be cast as norms of CIL.36  As a response to the use of such 
incorrect terminology, Sir Robert Jennings has noted ‘much of what we perversely persist 
in calling customary international law is not only not customary law: it does not even 
faintly resemble a customary law.’37  It is arguable that such unsound classification of 
CIL norms may be as a direct result of the uncertainties beleaguering the traditional bi-
partite definition.  Such definitional difficulties must be reduced in order that CIL can 
constitute a workable legal framework for norm-creation.  
 
  Much of the reliance on the more traditional explanations of CIL is inextricably 
linked with the preservation of state sovereignty. 38  The traditional doctrine, with its 
emphasis on state practice, can be termed as ‘positivist and individualistic’. 39  In a 
positivist view of CIL, such as that of Prosper Weil, the normative force of CIL exists 
only in its consensual nature.40  Therefore, by Weil’s reasoning, a re-imagined definition 
of CIL, one moving away from a seemingly state orientated approach, would result in 
CIL losing its legitimacy on the international plane.  Moreover, this impacts upon the 
seeming legitimacy of international law generally.  Under a positivistic conception of 
international legal relations, states constitute the sole foundation of law formation.41
 
There has been a vast increase in both the number of states and the number of 
non-state entities on the international plane and thus, the traditional positivistic account 
                                                 
34 Moreover, section 102 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, some what more unambiguously states that: ‘customary international law results from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.’  Meron, ibid at 
3. 
35 Byers, supra note 16 at 130; Roberts, supra note 13 at 758. 
36 Koskenniemi, ‘The Pull of the Mainstream’ 88 Michigan Law Review (1990) 1946 at 1948. 
37 Jennings, ‘The Identification of International Law’, in Cheng International Law, Teaching and Practice 
Stevens & Sons, 1982) cited in Roberts, supra note 13 at 759.  
38 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 2; Roberts, supra note 13 at 758. 
39 Charlesworth, ibid. 
40 Charlesworth, supra note 9 at 44.  See, Weil, supra note 22. 
41 For a positivistic account of international legal relations see, Weil, ibid. 
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of international law has been susceptible to challenge.42  The traditional views of CIL, 
and international law generally, are challenged by a theory of international law based on 
the interests of the global community of states.43  In effect, international law binds due to 
an international social consciousness that is designed to protect the global community of 
states.44  It is clear that the advent of a larger and moreover, multi-faceted international 
community may result in the limited utility of principles purely based upon sovereign 
equality.45 This relatively contemporary change in the international legal reality will filter 
into my re-imagination of CIL.  
 
ii) The Role of State Practice 
 
It has been stated that fully detailing what counts as state practice is practically 
impossible.46  However, for sake of clarity of definition, it is essential that the parameters 
of state practice are delimited.47  The majority of jurists seem to believe that cognisant 
acts – meaning acts are carried out with the knowledge of the state - resulting in direct or 
physical consequences are tantamount to state practice.48  Moreover, it is universally 
accepted that all organs of the state can contribute to state practice and thus, the 
formation of a CIL norm.49  D’Amato asserts that only those acts that have physical 
consequences can be deemed to count as state practice.50  This view has gained a certain 
degree of currency within opinions of the ICJ.51    A dissenting opinion by Judge Read in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case exemplifies such reasoning: 
                                                 
42 Charney, supra note 10 at 543; Roberts, supra note 13 at 759. 
43Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 2.  
44 Charlesworth, ibid.  It is noteworthy, that Charney terms such a view of the binding nature of CIL as 
‘societal context’, Charney, supra note 27 at 18. 
45 Byers, supra note 13 at 82.  
46 Bernhandt, supra note 13 at 900.  I will detail what role state practice plays and moreover, what counts as 
state practice  in my re-imagination of the CIL definition see Chapter Three. 
47 Byers, supra note 16 at 133. 
48 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 5. 
49 Bernhandt, supra note 13 at 900. 
50 D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1971) at pg 
191.  See, Byers, supra  note 16 at 134; Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 5; Roberts, supra note 13 at 757;  
51 Gunning, supra note 14 at 214. However, it is noteworthy that the ICJ has seeming also implicitly 
recognised that state practice is not limited to actual acts.  See, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Federal Republic of Germany –v-Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany –v- Netherlands) ICJ. Reports 
1969, pg 3 at  pg 20, para 14;  Asylum case, supra note 26 at pg 15.   See, Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of 
International Law 47 BYIL (1974-1975) 1 at 2; Byers, supra note 16 at 134. 
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Customary international law is the generalisation of the practice of States.  This 
cannot be established by citing cases where costal states have made extensive 
claims, but have not maintained their claims by the actual assertion of sovereignty 
over trespassing foreign ships.  Such claims may be important as starting 
points…The only convincing evidence of State practice is to be found in seizures, 
where the costal state asserts its sovereignty over the waters in question.52
 
 D’Amato’s assertion that only acts constitute state practice, as I will go on to 
discuss, may simply entrench divisions of power on the international plane.53 Moreover, 
the ICJ has implicitly accepted that other forms of state behaviour count as state 
practice.54  Akehurst deems the distinction that D’Amato carves between actions and 
other forms of state behaviour as ‘artificial’.55   D’Amato’s contention would seem to 
suggest that in order for a change in CIL to occur, the existing law must be violated.56  
This is quite clearly problematic and the quandary would seem to be even more acute in 
the realm of international criminal law.  It would be far from ideal to suggest that for a 
norm of international criminal law to evolve, considering the constraining and descending 
nature of the law, that the existing law be violated – in effect, requiring the commission 
of an international crime. 
 
 As previously asserted, the view that only acts are tantamount to state practice is 
not universal.57  In fact, it is widely believed that entry into binding agreements may 
constitute state practice.58  Within the text of the judgment of the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, entry into the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the 
conclusion of other delimitation agreements was seen to count as state practice. 59   
Moreover, some writers have argued for a far broader understanding of state practice, 
                                                 
52 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, supra note 27 at 191.  It is noteworthy that Akehurst stated that it 
appears to be unclear whether or not the ICJ agreed with the Opinion of Judge Read and in any event, such 
an Opinion is held by the minority.  Akehurst, ibid.  
53 Byers, supra note 13 at 84. 
54 See note 51.  See, Akehurst, supra note 51; Byers, supra note 16 at 134. 
55 Akehurst, ibid at 3. 
56 Byers, supra note 16 at 134. 
57 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003) at 6; 
Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 6; Greig, International Law (Butterworths: London, 1976) at 18. 
58 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 5. 
59North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 51; Charlesworth, ibid. 
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asserting that state behaviour of any kind may be equivalent to state practice.60 Such 
behaviour may include treaty ratifications, voting patterns at the UN General Assembly 
and perhaps most pertinently, omissions.61   
 
It would seem entirely inappropriate, particularly in the context of international 
criminal law, for the emphasis upon norm-creation to be seen simply as physical acts.62 It 
is apparent that the traditional doctrine allows little room for the existence of opinio juris.  
Within the traditional conception of CIL, the doctrinal prominence of state action can 
have a detrimental impact upon smaller states and their participation in the international 
order.63 Currently, the practice of the powerful and prominent is considered for purposes 
of state practice and smaller states are simply left to languish in the wake of norm-
creation.64  Despite the reality of power play on the international plane, some authors are 
unashamedly sanguine about the professed equality of traditional notions of CIL. 
  
Indeed customary law, resting as it does upon the authority and practice of all, is 
undaunting in its force, uncircumscribed by a minority of elites.65  
 
 It is noteworthy that there is no detailed guidance on how wide a specific practice 
must be.66  Moreover, most jurists maintain that there is an inverse relationship between 
duration and consistency of practice.67 The shorter the duration of the practice, the more 
consistent the practice must be and vice versa. In effect, a rule of CIL can be formed in a 
                                                 
60 Byers, supra note 16 at 134. 
61 Akehurst, supra note 51 at 10; Byers, ibid.  Byers points to the findings of the International Law 
Commission.  As regards divergent forms of state practice the law commission included: domestic judicial 
decision, domestic legislation, treaties and diplomatic correspondence.  Byers, ibid at 135.  It is noteworthy 
that other scholars have explicitly excluded the act of voting on UN GA Resolutions from the realm of state 
practice. See, Gunning, supra note 14 at 215; Schwebel, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly on Customary International Law’ 73 Am. Soc’y Int’l Proc. (1979) 302.  Whilst, other jurists have 
maintained that GA Resolutions are evidence of opinio juris and do not, therefore, count as state practice.  
See, Paust, supra note 13 at 73. 
62 Akehurst, supra note 51 at 41; Gunning, supra note 14 at 215. 
63 Byers, supra note 13 at 84 
64 Charney, supra note 10 at 537. 
65 Paust, supra note 13 at 63. 
66 Charelsworth, supra note 12 at 7.  It is noteworthy, that the creation of a regional or local custom is also 
permissible on the international plane. The traditional bi-partite doctrine is still a pre-requisite to the 
formation of such a rule and regional custom cannot contradict treaty provisions or jus cogens norms. See, 
Bernhardt, supra note 13 at 902. The ICJ has recognised this phenomenon in the Asylum case, supra note 
27 and The Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal –v- India) ICJ Reports, 
1960.    
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relatively short time frame.68  In fact, Cheng has argued that the formation of ‘instant’ 
custom is possible on the international plane.69  The ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases stated that ‘virtually uniform’ state practice was required if the practice at 
point had occurred in a short time period. 70  
 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, 
a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of 
what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement 
would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should 
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked; – and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.71
 
The facts of the case may serve to indicate the reasoning behind ‘extensive and 
virtually uniform’ practice being required. The case involved the transformation of a 
treaty-based provision into a customary one, in a relatively short time period. 72   
However, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases are not alone in demanding 
consistency. 73   In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case ‘substantial uniformity’ was 
deemed a pre-requisite.74  Furthermore, in the Asylum case a regional customary law was 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 Charlesworth, ibid at 7. 
68Bernhadnt, supra note 13 at 901; Charlesworth, ibid, Gunning, supra note 14 at 214.  Cheng has 
suggested that ‘instant’ custom may be created on the international plane.  See Cheng, supra note 13. 
69 See Cheng, supra note 13, Langville, ‘It’s ‘Instant Custom’: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After 
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001’ 26 B.C Int’L & Comp L. Rev (2003) 145 at 150. 
70 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 51 at 43, para 74.  
71 Ibid.  It is noteworthy, that in Judge Lachs’ dissenting Opinion he seems to point to the concept of 
‘instant’ custom.  He does so by detailing the customary status of freedom of movement in space and 
further states: ‘[t]he dimension of time in law, being relative, must be commensurate with the rate of 
movement of events which require legal regulation.  A consequential response is required.  And so the short 
period within which the law on the continental shelf has developed and matured does not constitute an 
obstacle to recognizing its principles and rules, including the equidistance rule, as part of general law.’  As 
per, Judge Lachs, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases at pg 230.  The dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs 
focuses on the formation of instant custom through state practice and, as such, seems to constitute a rather 
extreme version of the traditional doctrine’s reliance on state practice. See, Langville, supra note 69 at 150. 
For a discussion of instant custom, see Cheng, supra note 13. 
72 The Convention in question – Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf – had only entered into force 
in June 1964, and consequently there was a period of less than three years between the Convention entering 
into force and the commencement of proceeding before the ICJ.  Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 7. 
73 Ibid. 
74Charlesworth, ibid.  In the  Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Cases, supra note 27, at pg 131, the judgement 
stated: 
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considered not to have been established due to conflicting practice. 75   Despite the 
foregoing difficulties in ascertaining its exact meaning, state practice constitutes the 
cornerstone of the traditional doctrine of CIL formation and thus, it appears that there is 
little room for opinio juris.   
 
iii) The Role of Opinio Juris 
 
In traditional conceptions of CIL the role of opinio juris could be detailed as merely 
epiphenomenal to that of state practice.  Some jurists attribute this to the ‘elusive’ nature 
of the subjective element of CIL.76    Byers states that ‘since subjective feelings are 
difficult to identify, the analysis of customary rules has almost always focused on state 
practice.’77  As I will go on to discuss, I remain unconvinced that delimiting opinio juris 
is any more of a hardship than determining the content of state practice.  It is most 
certainly arguable that detailing what states actually believe constitutes a legal norm can 
be determined with a greater degree of ease than delimiting what states actually do.  In 
the context of international criminal law, as I will go on to discuss, such an assertion 
would seem to be even more pertinent. 
 
An examination of historical underpinnings of opinio juris is most instructive. 
The role of opinio juris in CIL norm-creation was first acknowledged, at least 
academically, at the beginning of the nineteenth century.78  Puchta and Savingy stated 
that custom was ‘merely the immediate and spontaneous revelation of the common 
popular sentiment.’ 79   Previously, the articulation of a subjective, or psychological, 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘…[T]he court deems it necessary to point out that although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain 
States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions 
have applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit.  Consequently, the ten-
mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law.’ 
75 Asylum case, supra note 27 at pg 277; Charlesworth ibid at 8.  
76 Charlesworth,  ibid. For a discussion of the professed intangible nature of opinio juris  see, Byers, supra 
note 13 at 83;  Slama, ‘Opinio Juris in International Law’ 15 Okla City U. L. Rev (1990) 603 at 615; Stern, 
‘Custom at the Heart of International Law’ 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L (2001) 89 at 95. 
77 Byers, ibid. 
78 Slama, supra note 76 at 613. 
79 Puchta & Savigny, cited in Slama, ibid at 613. 
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component in CIL was noticeable only by its absence.80  It is, however, important to note 
that Puchta and Savingy seemed to suggest all that was required for the formation of a 
norm of CIL, was the presence of this subjective element.81  In 1899 a theory - more in 
keeping with the contemporary understanding of CIL - was advanced by Gény.82  In 
combining material and subjective elements and applying them to the formation of CIL, 
Gény articulated a theory of formulation indistinguishable from the traditional bi-partite 
doctrine.83   Gény’s inclusion of a subjective element within the concept of CIL was to 
enable distinction between legal norms and non-legal norms.84
 
It is evident that opinio juris is not a novel concept.  However, despite this 
historical backdrop, no agreement exists on the exact content of opinio juris or on how 
one determines its existence.85  In fact, the discussion of opinio juris is often relegated to 
the realm of legal theory and as a concept it is given little practical consideration.86   
D’Amato attempts comprehensively to recapitulate the divergent theories of opinio juris 
and establishes four distinct schools of thought.87 First, he details what he terms the 
‘traditional’ conception of CIL – a belief by states that their acts are in conformity with, 
and perhaps even required by, existing legal norms.88  The second theory that D’Amato 
details equates opinio juris with consent.89   Thirdly, D’Amato depicts a theory of opinio 
juris that concerns state behaviour in multi-lateral convention or treaty conclusion.90  The 
final theory of opinio juris espoused by D’Amato is one that entails the opinion of the 
community of states; a theory of psychological consensus of the global community.91  
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Gény termed the subjective element of custom – opinio necessitatis.  See, Elias, supra note 13 at 504; 
Slama, ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Elias, ibid; Slama, supra note 76 at 613. 
85 Slama, ibid at 619 
86 Byers, supra note 13 at 86. 
87 D’Amato, supra note 50 at 66; Slama, supra note 76 at 620. 
88 D’Amato, ibid; Slama, ibid. 
89 D’Amato, ibid at 68; Slama, ibid.  See, Lobo de Souza, ‘The Role of State Consent in the Customary 
Process’ 44 ICLQ (1995) 521. 
90 D’Amato, ibid at 70; Slama, ibid. 
91 D’Amato, ibid at 72; Slama, ibid. 
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After detailing these divergent theories D’Amato states: ‘it is hard to find anything 
concrete, analytical, or useful in any of these hypotheses of opinio juris.’92
 
I submit that the nature of opinio juris is entirely dependent upon which theory of 
international law is preferred. 93   For the purposes of the traditional conceptions of 
international law, couched in positivistic and individualistic terms, the role opinio juris 
appears epiphenomenal to state practice.94   In fact, some jurists have questioned the 
utility of opinio juris at all.95   D’Amato reduces the importance of opinio juris to a mere 
articulation of legal intent.96  To this end he details opinio juris as ‘an objective claim of 
international legality articulated in advance of, or concurrently with, the act which will 
constitute the quantative elements of custom.’97  It seems that D’Amato’s reasoning is 
somewhat tautological and ventures no closer to elucidating the parameters of the CIL 
definition.98  
 
The disagreement regarding the content of the subjective element of CIL begs the 
question: are states truly ever motivated by opinio juris?  Goldsmith and Posner pose this 
very question and propose that states are not in fact motivated by opinio juris.99  They 
argue that the reality of international legal relations is that states are induced to act by 
coercion or self-interest.100  Despite inconsistencies regarding the exact content of opinio 
juris, there still appears to be the innate feeling that opinio juris is a necessary component 
in customary norm formulation.101  However, opinio juris plays second fiddle to state 
practice in traditional models of CIL.  On the rare occasion that attempts are made to 
detail the exact parameters of opinio juris, the subjective element is often found in the 
                                                 
92 D’Amato, ibid at 68. 
93 See, Elias, supra note 13 at 501. 
94Byers, supra note 13 at 83. 
95 Kelsen asserts that opinio juris is a fiction simply created in order to give the judiciary creative law 
making powers. Brownlie, supra note 57 at 8.  See, Bernhardt, supra note 13 at 899. 
96 D’Amato, supra note 50 at 74.  See, Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 11; Byers, supra note 13 at 86; 
Slama, supra note 76 at 623. 
97 D’Amato, ibid. 
98 Slama, supra note 76 at 623. 
99 Goldsmith & Posner , ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’ 66 U. CHI. L. Rev. (1999) 1113 
100Ibid; Norman & Trachtman, ‘The Customary International Law Game’ 99 AJIL (2005) 541 at 544. 
101 Brownlie, supra note 57 at 8. 
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realm of state practice and such reasoning is without doubt circular in nature.102  The role 
and content of opinio juris is somewhat more exact in the modern theories of CIL 
formation.  Within the text of Chapter Three I hope to explicate a definition of opinio 
juris that enables the subjective element of CIL to constitute the paramount force in 
norm-creation. 
 
iv) Shortcomings of the Traditional Model 
 
In critiquing the traditional model of CIL, the work of Koskenniemi is instructive.103  
Koskenniemi details the inherent tension between apology and utopia in international 
law.104   In effect, if international law - for these purposes CIL - is simply to be an 
expression of what states do, with no normative element to speak of, the resultant effect 
is that the law would simply constitute international relations under a different guise.105       
CIL norms could not be termed legal norms at all.  However, modern theories of CIL do 
not escape Koskenniemi’s criticism.  If CIL norms are merely descriptions of how states 
should act, without any connection with the reality of how states do act, they could be 
deemed, under Koskenniemi’s reasoning, as utopian. 106    
 
 For present purposes, the crux of Koskenniemi’s critique relates to the circular 
nature of definition of CIL.107  As previously averred, this circularity is most certainly 
present in the traditional model of CIL norm formulation - opinio juris is generally found 
within the sphere of state practice.108  Under the traditional conception of CIL, the two 
elements, in the traditional bi-partite doctrine, cannot be said to exist independently of 
                                                 
102 Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 40. 
103 See, ibid; Koskenneimi, supra note 36; Koskenniemi, supra note 10. 
104 Charlesworth, supra note 9 at 44; Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 363. 
105 Koskenniemi, ibid; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 495; Roberts, supra note 13 at 767. 
106Koskenniemi, ibid;  Powell & Pillay, ibid at 498; Roberts, ibid.  
107 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 10; Kennedy, supra note 16 at 407; Koskenniemi ibid at 40; Powell & 
Pillay, ibid  at 494; Roberts, ibid at 766. 
108 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 10.  Here, Charlesworth utilizes the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 51 at pg 176, as an illustration of the judiciary finding 
opinio juris within the realm of state practice. 
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one another.109 The resultant effect is that the traditional doctrine does not allow there to 
be a coherent method of delimiting customary international norms.110  
    
The traditional conception of CIL norm creation creates what Byers terms as a 
‘chronological paradox’.111  This ‘chronological paradox’ concerns how rules of CIL are 
actually created.  In effect, in order for a new rule of CIL to emerge, states must believe 
that the rule already exists.112   It has been suggested that states could erroneously believe 
that they are bound and thus, the paradox is solved.113  However, the suggestion that an 
entire legal process is based upon a falsehood seems at the least tenuous.   
 
 The traditional CIL doctrine is often charged with endorsing current patterns of 
state power.114  If the emphasis is purely upon what states do, then the most powerful 
players in the international arena, those states that inevitably act the most, are completely 
instrumental in shaping CIL norms. 
 
If state practice is treated as the primary element of customary international law, it 
becomes difficult to regard disparities of wealth and military power as irrelevant 
in the formation of customary rules.  In terms of their ability to engage in practice 
across a wide range of issues, and thereby influence the development of 
customary rules, the tiny island country of Tuvalu (population 10,600) and the 
United States are patently unequal.115
 
The tendency in CIL formation, to rely on the practice of larger states serves to fuel the 
assumption that the smaller, less powerful states have acquiesced to the emerging 
                                                 
109 Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 495. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Byers, supra note 16 at 130. 
112 Byers ibid at 131; Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 361.  It is noteworthy, that this criticism was one that 
was levelled by D’Amato at, what he termed, ‘traditional’ conceptions of opinio juris.  See note 87.  Byers 
suggests that D’Amato may have ‘circumvented’ the chronological paradox through envisaging opinio juris 
as an ‘articulation’. Byres, supra note 16 at 132.  However, I remain unconvinced of the utility of the 
‘articulation’.  To all intents and purposes it appears no different to traditional understandings of opinio 
juris - D’Amato’s construct still centres upon a legal belief and is simply accompanied by articulation of 
such a belief and he fails to suggest where such articulation is to be found.   
113 Byers, ibid at 131; Slama, supra note 76 at 622. 
114 Byers, supra note 13 at 84. 
115 Ibid. 
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norm.116   Often, the reality is simply that the smaller states are utterly unaware of the 
impending formation of new CIL norm by which they will ultimately be bound.117  
 
 The discrepancy between what states profess to do and what they actually do is 
quite pronounced.118 This is a fact that seems to be overlooked by the traditional CIL 
doctrine.  Here, an analogy with the prohibition upon torture is instructive.119  Whilst, 
states denounce torture, almost universally, and wax lyrical about the illegality of such 
practice, the reality is quite different.120  One only needs to briefly examine the recent 
alleged activity of the CIA in Eastern Europe as a stark example of this point.121  If the 
creation of CIL norms were to be based entirely upon state practice, I would maintain that 
many of the international community’s dearly held human rights norms would be 
rendered non-applicable.  Perhaps, what states profess to do in the process of norm 
creation is more important than actual state practice.   
 
It would seem that the traditional conception of CIL is far from a determinate 
means of delimiting custom.    Due to the uncertain nature of the content of CIL, those 
that unwittingly apply CIL norms are often accused of using CIL as a tool, however ill-
fitting, as a means of serving a previously determined end. 
 
CIL is often, the first, last and only refuge –the virtual conversation-stopper – for 
international lawyers trying to get out of an analytical jam.122
 
                                                 
116 Byers, supra note 13 at 84 
117 Charney, supra note 10 at 536. 
118 Byres, supra note 16 at 135 
119 The prohibition on the torture is found in: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984. Entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance 
with article 27 (1).   There are currently 74 signatories to the Convention and 141 parties.  Last updates 26th 
January 2006.  Available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm , last viewed 20th 
February 2006. 
120 Byers, supra note 16 at 135; Roberts, supra note 13 at 769. 
121 See Dworkin, ‘New Light on the CIA’s Secret Detention Programme’, available at: 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-cia3.html, last viewed 20th February 2006. 
122 Estreicher, ‘Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law’ 44 Va. J. Int’l L (2003-
2004) 5. 
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Will the modern conception of custom provide a more workable definition?  Perhaps, it is 
possible to exact a definition of custom that does not fall foul of criticism of circularity. I 
hope to deconstruct CIL as a concept and re-imagine a definition of CIL that is 
theoretically sound and moreover, workable as regards delimiting norms of international 
criminal law.  In order to achieve such ends it is a necessity to examine the modern 






























CHAPTER TWO:  The Formation of CIL: The Modern Conceptions under the 
Microscope 
 
i) The Rise of Opinio Juris 
  
As previously averred, the modern doctrine of CIL is largely concerned with opinio 
juris. 123   Roberts states that the modern constructions of CIL reflect ‘substantive 
normativity.’124   In juxtaposing the traditional with the modern, Roberts reveals that 
traditional formations of CIL can be equated with ‘description.’125   In effect, the norms 
of modern CIL are to be found in abstract normative standards – opinio juris.  On the 
other hand, traditional CIL norms originate from what states do and thus can be labelled 
‘descriptive’.  The modern doctrine’s reliance upon normative statements results in the 
creation of CIL norms in somewhat of a more expedient fashion.126 Jurists appear to have 
a propensity to resort to treaties and declarations to prove the existence, or otherwise, of 
opinio juris. 127  As such, the doctrines of modern CIL can be portrayed as more 
democratic than traditional conceptions of custom.128      
 
Most states can participate in the negotiation and ratification of treaties and 
declarations of international fora, such as the United Nations General 
Assembly.129   
 
                                                 
123 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 22; Roberts, supra note 13 at 764. 
124 Roberts, ibid. 
125 Ibid at 763. 
126 Ibid at 768.  It is a reliance on opinio juris that results in Cheng’s proposal of the existence of ‘instant’ 
custom.  See Cheng, supra note 13. 
127 Roberts, Ibid.  In the Nicaragua case, supra note 32, the Court utilised UN GA Resolutions and other 
declarations to illustrate the existence of opinio juris.  See, Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 23; Kirgis, supra 
note 14 at 147; Morrison, ‘Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion’ 81 AJIL (1987) 160 at 161. 
128 The view that the modern doctrine of CIL is more democratic is not universal.  Some theorists maintain 
that the realties of power play pervade CIL generally, regardless of whether one prefers a traditional or a 
modern construction of CIL.  See, Byres, supra note 13 at 84; Stern, supra note 76. 
129 Roberts, supra note 13 at 768. 
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  The starting point for any discussion of the formation of modern custom is the 
Nicaragua case.130 CIL norms constituted the basis of the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua.131  
This was a result of an US reservation restricting the acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction under Article 36(2). 132  The ‘Vandenberg’ reservation stated that ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction would not apply to the US vis-à-vis disputes regarding multi-
lateral treaty obligations, unless all parties affected by Court’s decision were party to 
treaty in question, or the US explicitly agreed to such jurisdiction.133  The Nicaraguan 
application to the ICJ relied upon four multi-lateral treaties, all of which the US and 
Nicaragua were party to.134  However, the US successfully argued that Honduras, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador would be affected by any decision of the Court and thus, the 
reservation was applicable.135  The majority of the court accepted the US reasoning,136 
                                                 
130See, Nicaragua, supra note 31.  It is noteworthy, that upon discovering the initiation of the proceedings, 
the United States indicated to the Court that it had suspended its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction a 
propos disputes with any Central American State.  The Court concluded that it still had jurisdiction and 
proceeded to the merits of the case.  Further to this, the US indicated that the situation in question was one 
that was intrinsically political in character and on those grounds withdrew its participation in the case.  The 
US then terminated the Courts compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.  However, 
the Court proceeded without US participation and still came to a decision on the merits of the case.  Maier, 
‘Appraisals of the ICJ’S Decision: Nicaragua –v- United States (merits) 81 AJIL (1987) 77 
131 For reasoning as to why CIL norms constitute the backbone of the judgment see: Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua –v- United States) Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 1984 ICJ Reports 392; Charlesworth, supra note 12. 
132 See Franck, ‘Some Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations’ 81 AJIL (1987) 
116 at 118.  Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute states:  ‘The States parties to the present Statute may at any 
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
b) any question of international law; 
c) the existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation 
d) the nature or the extent of the reparation to be made for breach of an international obligation. 
For a further discussion of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction see: Kelly, ‘The International Court of 
Justice: Crisis & Reformation’ 12 Yale Int Law J (1987) 342; Merrills, ‘The Optional Clause Today’ 50 
BYIL (1979) 87; Waldock, ‘Decline of the Optional Clause’ 32 BYIL  (1955-56) 244.   
133 Briggs, ‘The International Court of Justice Lives up to its Name’ 81 AJIL (1987) 78 at 80;  
134 The relevant multi-lateral treaties were: Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation 
of American States, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of States of 26th December 1933 
and the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife of 20th February 1928.  
See, Nicaragua, supra note 131 at 422 para 68.  
135 Nicaragua, supra note 131 at  para 68.  See, Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 17 
136 Nicaragua, ibid at para 69; Charlesworth, ibid. 
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however, Nicaragua had also applied to the Court under CIL norms and the Court 
decided the case on that basis.137
 
 The case concerned a Nicaraguan claim that the US had violated CIL through the 
use of armed force and unlawfully intervening in its domestic affairs. 138  In the 
judgement, the Court seemingly endorsed the application of the tradition bi-partite 
doctrine.139
 
[T]he Court has to next consider what are the rules of customary international law 
applicable to the present dispute.  For this purpose, it has to direct its attention to 
the practice and opinio juris of States.140
 
Despite detailing the bi-partite doctrine, the Court did not employ it, at least not in the 
traditional sense, in its judgement.  There was no empirical enquiry into state practice.141  
The relevant norms of CIL were identified despite a distinct lack of state practice in 
support of the norms.142 As I will go on to discuss, such a lack of empirical enquiry 
appears to be endemic in legal reasoning. The Court, in finding that the US had in fact 
breached CIL,143averred that inconsistencies in state practice did not act as an indictor of 
the absence of a norm as long as such inconsistencies were treated as breaches of the rule 
in question.144   
 
                                                 
137 Charlesworth, ibid; Morrison, supra note 127 at 161.  As regards the application of CIL, the court stated: 
‘There are a number of reasons for considering that, even if two norms belonging to two sources of 
international law appear identical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these rules 
both on the level of treaty –law and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate 
existence. Nicaragua case, supra note 31 at 95 para 177. 
138 Maier, supra note 130 at 77. 
139 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 17. 
140 Nicaragua case, supra note 31 at 97, para 183.  Here, the Court drew attention the Continental Shelf 
(Libyian Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case, supra note 12, whereby the Court described the traditional bi-
partite model ‘axiomatic’. 
141 Charlesworth, supra note 12 at 20. 
142 D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary International Law’ 81 AJIL (1987) 101 at 102. 
143 The Court stated: ‘Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing 
and supplying the contra  forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its 
obligations under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state.’  See 
Nicaragua, supra note 31 at 146. 
144 Roberts, supra note 13 at 759. 
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The Court relied almost exclusively on normative standards, which it located in 
Resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Friendly Relations Declaration of 
1970.145   Here, the Court appeared to suggest that opinio juris can be found within 
Resolutions and multi-lateral treaties. I would maintain that the act of voting at the UN 
GA in of itself cannot constitute individual opinio juris. 146  It is essential that the 
psychological factor of CIL be re-iterated.147  GA Resolutions may constitute evidence of 
opinio juris but not opinio juris itself.  These aforementioned Resolutions and 
declarations were seen as confirmation of the existence of a CIL norm.148  The Court, in 
hingeing its decision upon these normative standards, identified CIL norms prohibiting 
the use of force, despite a lack of state practice supporting the asserted normative 
standards.149
 
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient 
that the conduct of the states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and 
instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have 
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new 
rule.  If a state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within 
the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that 
basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.150
 
The reasoning in the Nicaragua judgement has been criticised by several jurists.  
In fact, D’Amato termed the judgement a ‘failure of legal scholarship’.151  He further 
states that the judgement contained no independent evidence of the theory that the Court 
employed.152  If one employs Koskenniemi’s reasoning the judgment may be criticised as 
                                                 
145 UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625, UN GOAR Supp. 
(No.28) at 121, UN Doc.A/8028 (1970) See, Kirgis, supra note 14 at 147; Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 
371.  See, Nicaragua case, supra note 31 at pg 106, para 202. 
146 D’Amato, supra note 50 at 102. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 371. 
149 Charlesworth, supra note 9 at 45; Kirgis, supra note 14 at 147. 
150 Nicaragua case, supra note 31 at 98, para 186. 
151 D’Amato, supra note 50 at 105.  It is noteworthy, that the Nicaragua case has not been universally 
criticised see:  Briggs, supra note 133. 
152 Ibid. 
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hopelessly utopian. 153   This is due to what Charlesworth terms the separation of 
‘compliance and custom.’154  In effect, the judgement, asserting that a prohibitive norm 
of CIL exists, has no correlation with international reality.  However, as I shall go on to 
discuss, I do not believe that it is essential that international law reflect the reality of state 
behaviour and this seems particularly pertinent in the realm of international criminal law.  
Perhaps, the reality is simply that states breach international legal norms.    
 
 The modern doctrine, in its elevation of opinio juris, does not escape criticism of 
circularity.155  More often than not, opinio juris is proven by resort to state practice and 
the requisite psychological element is all but forgotten.   It seems that neither element of 
the traditional doctrine can exist independently of one another.  I submit that it possible to 
re-imagine a definition of CIL that breaks this endemic circularity. However, such a 
definition must be re-imagined out with the constraints of Article 38.   The traditional bi-
partite definition must be abandoned in its entirety, in order to facilitate a workable and 
practicable definition. 
 
ii) Kirgis and the sliding scale 
 
Kirgis attempts to reconcile traditional and modern approaches to custom through what 
he terms the ‘sliding scale’.156   In doing so, he does not stray from the confines of 
Article 38.  He avers that the divergent CIL doctrines can be reconciled if they are not 
viewed as ‘mutually exclusive’. 157   Instead, he maintains, they must be viewed as 
‘interchangeable along a sliding scale.’158  In effect, the stronger the evidence of opinio 
juris the less evidence of state practice required to prove the existence of a CIL norm and 
vice versa. 
 
                                                 
153 See Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 363; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 495; Roberts, supra note 13 at 
762. 
154 Charlesworth, supra note 9 at 45. 
155 See, Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 40. 
156 Kirgis, supra note 14; Roberts, supra note 13 at 760. 
157 Kirgis, ibid at 149. 
158 Ibid; Roberts, supra note 13 at 760. 
 24
On the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice establishes a 
customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of opinio juris, so long 
as it is not negated by evidence of a non-normative intent.  As the frequency and 
the consistency of the practice decline in any series of cases, a stronger showing 
of opinio juris is required.  At the other end of the scale, a clearly demonstrated 
opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative 
showing that governments are consistently behaving in accordance with the 
asserted rule.159
 
The element preferred in employing the sliding scale, whether that is opinio juris 
or state practice, is entirely dependent upon the seeming significance, or otherwise, of the 
CIL norm in point.160  In effect, the application of the sliding scale is inextricably linked 
to whether given situations are seen as issues of high or low politics.  If the CIL norm in 
question is not seen an issue of high politics, such as the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, the international judiciary will require that both elements of the traditional bi-
partite doctrine are fulfilled.161   However, if the CIL norm in question concerns the 
prohibition of on the use of force, or a similarly important CIL norm, the international 
judiciary will forgo one of the elements in order that a rational result ensues.162   
 
The more destabilizing or morally distasteful the activity – for example, the 
offensive use of force or the deprivation of fundamental human rights – the more 
readily international decision makers will substitute one element for the other, 
provided the asserted restricted rule seems reasonable.163   
 
It is most certainly arguable that international criminal law is a matter of high 
politics.  By Kirgis’ reasoning, this could relegate state practice to an entirely peripheral 
role in the delimitation of customary international criminal norms.  If one employs 
Kirgis’ sliding scale, in the realm of international criminal law, it is wholly plausible that 
state practice is rendered at the most a secondary concern.    
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Simma and Alston assert that there is somewhat of an ‘irresistible’ temptation to 
develop doctrines of CIL that re-interpret custom to provide the ‘right’ answers.164   This 
criticism is most certainly pertinent as regards Kirgis.165  The sliding scale seems to lack 
consistency and coherence.  Moreover, it seems to allow the international judiciary too 
much creative space.  Any workable doctrine of CIL should be precise and enable the 
international judiciary concisely and consistently to apply principles of international law 
and not enable the judiciary actually to create the principles in question.  In the realm of 
international criminal law, this consistency is absolutely essential in order to facilitate the 
application of principles that constitute constraining and descending law.166  However, 
Kirgis paints a rather pessimistic picture of international legal relations if the sliding scale 
were not to be employed. 
 
The alternative would be an international legal order containing ominous silences 
– where treaty commitments cannot be found – concerning the ways in which 
state impose their wills on other states or individuals.167
 
Kirgis seems to draw on natural law principles and, I would maintain, the sub-text of 
sliding scale is directly correlated to morality.  The international judiciary is left with the 
rather unenviable task of discerning what constitutes a ‘morally distasteful’ activity and 
moreover, what the reasonable result should be.  Clearly, as regards CIL norms, all form 
of norm delimitation involves an inevitable amount of law creation.168  However, Kirgis’ 
sliding scale seems to locate an inordinate amount of law making power with the 
international judiciary. Such legislative power should vests in states and not the 
international judiciary.169
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 Moreover, Kirgis does not escape the criticism of circularity.170  Yet again the two 
elements of the bi-partite doctrine are not independent of one another and the ‘hamster 
wheel’ of CIL discourse continues to roll on unabated.171  Byers states that the only 
possible method of avoiding criticism of circularity, in the given context, is using 
D’Amato’s distinction between state practice and ‘articulation’. 172    Regardless of 
whether or not one applies the distinction propounded by D’Amato, Kirgis’ sliding scale 
seems inappropriate for the demands of international criminal law and CIL generally.  It 
is not a coherent form of norm creation and, whilst attempting to reconcile traditional and 
modern approaches to CIL within the confines of Article 38, the sliding scale firmly 
places much of the powers of norm creation within the hands of the international 
judiciary.  It is once again apparent that it is necessary, in order that a workable definition 
of CIL is advanced, to look beyond the constraints of Article 38. 
 
iii) Non-state Actors and the formation of CIL 
 
Gunning is at the fore of the debate calling for the inclusion of non-state actors in CIL 
norm creation.173  This appears to be a theory of CIL norm creation that looks outside the 
confines of Article 38.  However, in reality most jurists attempt to reconcile their theory 
with the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  Gunning avers that the inclusion of non-state 
actors is an absolute necessity in order that contemporary demands of the human rights 
movement are met.174   Before detailing how the inclusion of non-state actors within 
custom formation may be facilitated, it is essential to distinguish state-based international 
organisations and independent organisations.  For present purposes, a state-based 
organisation can be understood as one that is instituted by states, or by an organisation of 
states and cannot be classed as entirely independent from state influence. A non-state 
based organisation is one that may be classified as an independent entity.  State parties 
are not instrumental in their inception and membership of such an organisation is not 
composed of state parties. 
                                                 
170 Byers, supra note 16 at 137. 
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In general, the discussion of the involvement of non-state actors centres upon the 
UN GA.175 It is argued that the actions of international organisations, particularly those 
whose members are state parties – such as the UN GA - should constitute state practice 
for the purposes of the creation of CIL norms.176  Moreover, Gunning controversially 
argues for a much wider conception of international organisations and calls for NGOs to 
have a role in the creation of CIL norms.177  Whilst, making a distinction between state-
based and non-state based organisations, Gunning argues that both types of organisation 
be included in custom formation. 
 
It would seem, however, that the practice of international organisations can also 
create rules of customary law.178   
 
  Theorists argue that voting at the GA, whether those votes be positive or negative, 
may constitute state practice or opinio juris and thus, the GA could hold a key role in CIL 
norm-creation.179  It is noteworthy that jurists are often unclear whether the actions of 
non-state actors should constitute state practice or opinio juris.180  However, whichever 
element of the bi-partite doctrine is favoured, such an assertion seems to stand in stark 
contradiction to the UN Charter.181  The Charter clearly articulates that GA Resolutions 
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are only ‘recommendations’ and thus the arguments as to their binding nature may appear 
slightly strained. Furthermore, it seems apparent that state voting patterns in the GA are 
not intended, particularly by the states themselves, to generate legal norms.182  Despite 
the international legal grounding of the UN GA and the status afforded to its Resolutions, 
Gunning terms the exclusion of GA Resolutions from CIL norm creation 
‘unreasonable’.183  
 
If the acts or practices of nations as individual nations are considered legitimate, 
to dismiss the acts or practices of those same nations when they act in concert is 
unreasonable, especially in a community oriented toward the peaceful discussion 
and resolution of disputes.184  
 
I would submit that whilst GA Resolutions cannot in of themselves constitute 
binding legal norms, the Charter makes this much quite clear, they may, however, be 
evidence of the existence of a binding norm within the realm of CIL. This begs the 
question: how can the inclusion of non-state organisations be reconciled with state 
sovereignty on the international plane? It is arguable that their inclusion would drastically 
undermine positivistic conceptions of international legal relations.185 It seems apparent 
that their inclusion would emasculate the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  
 
Allowing non-state actors a role in the generation of customary international law 
would undermine the traditional requirements of state practice and opinio juris.186  
 
The traditional bi-partite doctrine bases CIL norm-formation entirely upon the 
actions (state practice) and beliefs (opinio juris) of states.  The inclusion of non-state 
actors, within the constraints of Article 38, serves to disrupt the traditional definition. 
However, perhaps the weakening of the traditional doctrine is a necessity in order that a 
workable definition, one that fits contemporary concerns, can be advanced.  In discussing 
the inclusion of non-state actors in the creation of CIL, Charlesworth points to Franck’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation’ 11 California Western International Law 
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182 Roberts, supra note 13 at 769. 
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‘linkage of fairness and compliance’.187 Here, she suggests that the inclusion of non-state 
actors in CIL norm creation would potentially increase the perceived levels of fairness a 
propos the process itself and the resultant norms.188  
 
 Gunning argues that the contemporary process of CIL formation is rooted in an 
erroneous presumption.189  She avers that the supposition that states are supreme no 
longer reflects the reality of international legal relations.190  Franck, in asserting that the 
international legal community has expanded, seemingly endorses Gunning’s standpoint. 
 
Only a few decades ago, international law applied exclusively to states.  Today, it 
is an intricate network of laws governing a myriad of rights and duties that stretch 
across and beyond national boundaries, piercing the statist veil even while it 
sometimes pretends nothing has changed.191
 
It is apparent that, to a certain degree, state behaviour is influenced and manipulated by 
factors outside the traditional statist view of international legal relations.192  Perhaps this 
paradigm shift necessitates the inclusion of non-state actors within the realm of custom 
creation.  However, I remain unconvinced that this can be achieved within the constraints 
of Article 38.  It is increasingly apparent that an entirely new definition of CIL is needed 
in order that norms may be discerned in a coherent fashion.   
Somewhat controversially, Gunning includes NGOs, as non-state actors, in the 
process of custom formation.193 Her reasoning behind the inclusion of NGOs mirrors her 
reasoning for the inclusion of non-state actors generally – state sovereignty is not 
absolute.194 Whilst international organisations, such as the UN, are state-based creations, 
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 30
NGOs act independently of states.195  Gunning seems to view the independence of NGOs 
as a positive factor in the process of norm-creation.196  By the inclusion of NGOs within 
the ambit of non-state actor, Gunning disconnects entirely from notions of state 
sovereignty.  Under the theory propounded by Gunning, non-state actors, that are not 
even created by state parties and moreover, in which state parties have no material 
involvement, can have a central role in international norm-creation.  I would maintain 
that such a theory has insurmountable theoretical problems. 
 
Gunning asserts that non-state actors generally be included ‘as equal participants 
in international organization.’197   However, how does one include non-state actors in 
CIL norm creation?  Gunning details two divergent methods for inclusion.198  Firstly, she 
suggests increasing the role of international organisations, so their acts are deemed to 
constitute collective state practice. 199   Secondly, she suggests, that the international 
community recognise that NGOs have a ‘distinct, measurable impact on international 
affairs.’200  However, Gunning fails to indicate quite how this can be achieved. Whilst 
stating that NGOs should have a role in CIL formation, the identification of the exact 
parameters of that role is noticeable only by its absence.  
 
 It is noteworthy that Charlesworth maintains that employment of non-state actors 
in CIL formation is most effective within the domestic sphere.201  This assertion could be 
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particularly relevant in discerning a suitable role for NGOs in custom formation.  If 
NGOs were to partake in CIL formation, determining which NGOs are to have such a 
role could be problematic202 By including NGOs, organizations with largely no material 
connection to the state, Gunning not only alters CIL but the shape of the international 
community entirely.  I find no international legal support for Gunning’s assertion.  
Gunning seems to simply appeal to morality and the reality of the international legal 
order and consequently, conclude that states and NGOs share an equal status.  
 
Gunning indicates that the inclusion of non-state actors in norm creation may 
create paradoxes in traditional conceptions of custom. 203   However, Gunning’s 
understanding of such a paradox is quite unclear.  Gunning may have been suggesting 
that if non-state actors form part of CIL creation, there may be a situation whereby 
divergent patterns of behaviour exist between the relevant states and the non-state 
actors. 204  Here, an examination of S –v- Petane is useful in elucidating Gunning’s 
meaning.205  The case concerned the customary status of Additional Protocol 1 to the 
Geneva Conventions.206  If the Additional Protocol were held to be part of CIL, it would 
have been automatically incorporated into South African law. 207   In asserting that 
Additional Protocol I constituted CIL, the defendant referred to GA Resolutions. 208  
Conradie J asserted that GA Resolutions do not constitute state practice for the purposes 
of CIL formation and further stated that: ‘Customary international law is founded on 
practice, not on preaching.’209  Ultimately, the Court held that the Additional Protocol 
had not become part of CIL. 210   Such reasoning may be illustrative of Gunning’s 
‘paradox’ – the behaviour of a state may be entirely distinct from the behaviour of a non-
state actor. 
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 However, if the behaviour of a state instituted non-state actor is at point, I see no 
real difference between a paradox in the given situation and within the traditional 
conception of CIL.  Under the traditional conception of custom, excluding the actions of 
non-state actors, a state may not have the requisite opinio juris or state practice and will 
still be bound by a general rule of custom.211 Within the context of S –v- Petane, South 
Africa’s behaviour was not distinct nationally and internationally – regardless of the 
action of states in concert. South Africa, in this case, had not acceded to the Convention 
in question and its practice domestically did not appear to stray from this. So, in effect, 
no paradox actually existed.   
 
However, Gunning may be suggesting a quite different understanding of 
‘paradox.’ In effect, she may be proposing that a state may have a belief domestically and 
hold an entirely different belief in concert with the international community. 212  For 
example, State X signs and ratifies the Torture Convention and continues to use torture as 
a method of interrogation domestically.213  It is arguable that the problem of paradoxical 
behaviour could be drastically reduced if opinio juris is to be favoured in delimiting CIL 
norms.  Whilst impossible to prove, it seems more likely that a state may act differently 
in the global community of states and domestically. If the activities, of state instituted 
non-state actors are seen to impact upon opinio juris, it seems unlikely that a state could 
have an individual opinio juris that differs greatly from a belief that it holds in concert 
with other states.214  Or at least, such a divergence would be extremely difficult to prove.   
 
It is arguable that states may be less willing to participate in international 
organisations, if such organisations were seen as legally binding.   
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One criticism of this approach could be that nations would be reluctant to 
participate in international organizations or their agencies if the organizations acts 
were legally binding.215  
 
However, Gunning suggests that states cannot ‘afford’ to be excluded from international 
organisations through non-participation.216  Perhaps this is true of states with less power 
on the international plane.  The most powerful states can and do ‘afford’ not to 
participate in transnational organisations.  Gunning even points to the US withdrawal 
from UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).217 However, she 
merely states that this illustrates that ‘isolationism is the exception, not the rule.’218  State 
participation, or rather non-participation, in the International Criminal Court (ICC), is 
another pertinent example of the ability of powerful states to freely choose which 
international organisations they can ‘afford’ to be part of.219  The US, whilst largely 
shaping the structure of the Statute and the accompanying negotiations, ultimately did not 
become party to the treaty establishing the Court and can very much ‘afford’ to remain as 
such.220  
 
 I would maintain that there is a role in CIL formation for organisations – such as 
the UN GA – whose representatives are made up of nation states.  I remain unconvinced 
that NGOs should or could have a role in CIL norm creation.  Moreover, in order that 
non-state actors, for my purposes state-based international actors, have a role in CIL 
creation, it is essential that one looks outside the constraints of Article 38.  The current 
definition, whether understood in traditional or modern terms, does not allow for the 
inclusion of non-state actors without stretching the boundaries of interpretation. 
  
iv) Shortcomings of the modern approaches to custom: beyond Article 38? 
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It is noteworthy that the criticisms of modern custom are often directly correlated to the 
advantages of the traditional doctrine and vice versa.221 In exacting a definition of CIL 
that attempts to re-interpret Article 38, it is almost impossible to dissect the two divergent 
approaches.  The modern and traditional approaches to custom are inextricably linked 
and this is best explained through Koskenniemi’s theory of circularity.222  If custom 
relies upon the normative element, opinio juris, it may be accused, under Koskenniemi’s 
reasoning, with being utopian.223  In effect, it bears no relation to the reality of what 
states actually do. Roberts details modern custom as ‘descriptively inaccurate’. 224  
However, as I shall go on to discuss, why should CIL relate to what states do?  
 
Cassese avers that the traditional and modern doctrines of international law co-exist 
on the international plane.225  He states that the modern conceptions of international law 
have not quite succeeded in replacing the more traditional rhetoric.226 This, he claims, is 
largely due to the structure of the international plane and the enduring emphasis upon 
individualistic and state sovereignty orientated approaches.227  As I will go on to discuss, 
it is apparent that whilst contemporary academic thought favours the modern approach to 
CIL formulation, this is not echoed within the realm of judicial decision making.228 Is it 
possible to present a theory of international law that still respects state sovereignty, whilst 
challenging the traditional, somewhat outdated, conceptions of the reality of the 
international legal plane? 
 
  It seems that proving the existence opinio juris is not a simple task. Whilst 
disagreement persists in defining the exact parameters of opinio juris, proving its 
existence is an unenviable task. 229  The normative element of CIL is often located within 
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the material element of state practice. Any workable definition of CIL must carefully 
define the parameters of the normative element. To this end, it is essential to look out 
with the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  However, can a definition of CIL exacted out with 
the parameters of Article 38 be reconciled with international legal theory? 
 
In order not to make custom seem like a natural morality, it will have to justify its 
norms ultimately by reference to concrete State practice and opinio juris.230  
 
Despite Koskenniemi’s criticism, as I will go to discuss, I believe it is possible to discern 
a definition of CIL, that is not within the confines of Article 38, that is reconcilable with 
notions of state sovereignty and does not simply reflect ‘natural morality.’231
 
 An examination of international criminal law serves to indicate that the modern 
approaches to CIL are somewhat more appropriate for the realm of constraining and 
descending law.232  However, the circularity of modern CIL is criticised and moreover, 
proving a rule of CIL is still an almost impossible task.  Charlesworth states that modern 
CIL can only be rationalised if the ‘traditional rhetoric’ of custom is cast aside.233 It is 
often stated that traditional conceptions of custom allow powerful states to shape the 
law.234 However, Stern argues that articulation of opinio juris is also directly effected by 
power.235  In effect, inequality pervades the entire formation of CIL.  Is it possible to 
exact a definition of CIL that is coherent, democratic and avoids criticism of circularity?  
It is increasingly apparent, that it is necessary to dispense with Article 38 and look 
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CHAPTER THREE: CIL in the Wake of International Criminal Law: Re-
Imagining a Definition 
 
i) International Criminal Law and CIL 
 
The apparent theoretical and practical frailties of both the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
doctrines of CIL serve to indicate the need for an entirely new approach to customary 
international norm delimitation.  It is essential to set apart international criminal law, as a 
distinct species of international law, in order to credibly to re-cast notions of CIL for 
application in the international criminal justice system and discern how the specifics of 
international criminal law may impact upon CIL norm employment.  
 
 The traditional theoretical conceptions of international law are increasingly 
challenged on the international plane, however, modern theories have not succeeded in 
dethroning the traditional rhetoric of state sovereignty and individualism.236  As such, 
two strong opposing theoretical forces exist within international criminal law – ascending 
law and descending law - that at times can appear diametrically opposed.237  International 
law offers what can be termed a ‘horizontal framework’ 238  based, at least in the 
traditional sense, on the sovereign equality of states.239 Criminal law is quite distinct and 
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concerns law that could be termed as constraining and descending law; a horizontal 
framework does not exist.240  
 
Criminal law as a tool of international lawyers faces an enormous challenge…it is 
supposed to be, by definition, positivistic discipline of the law, based on the 
fundamental importance of legality, the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege.241
 
This so-called ‘challenge’ is even more pertinent in the realm of customary international 
criminal law.  If there is no coherent method of norm delimitation, it would seem unlikely 
that the tension in international criminal law – between ascending and descending law – 
can be reconciled.  I will endeavour to advance a theory that will go someway towards 
reconciling this tension. 
 
International criminal law has expanded more in the last fifty years than in the last 
five hundred. 242
 
Recent decades have seen a veritable ‘explosion’ of international criminal law 
enforcement.243  The establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals indicated the international 
community’s intention to enforce substantive international criminal law.244  Sunga called 
the creation of the ICTY the first ‘tangible’ measure undertaken by the international 
community as regards international criminal law enforcement. 245   Such a flurry of 
judicial activity is not only present on the international plane; domestic prosecutions for 
international crime have also seen a sharp increase.246  Perhaps, the most important of 
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these domestic cases has been the United Kingdom House of Lords decision in the 
Pinochet cases.247     
 
However, the development of the enforcement mechanisms of international 
criminal law is an entirely modern phenomenon. 248  It is certainly true to say that 
international criminal law is a relatively new branch of the law.249 Before World War II, 
prosecutions for international crime were noticeable only by their absence.250  Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, several European states codified certain crimes of war, 
however, little followed in the way of prosecution. 251  At the end of World War I, calls 
for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide 
were left unanswered.252  The unimaginable horrors visited upon Europe by the Nazi 
final solution provided the impetus, for what could be described as the first international 
criminal tribunal – Nuremberg.253   However, after Nuremberg there was a significant lull 
                                                 
247 See, R –v- Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2001] 1 AC 147, 
(hereinafter, Pinochet No 3)  It is noteworthy, that I will examine Pinochet as regards CIL norms in Chapter 
IV. For a discussion of the Pinochet precedent see: Murphy, ‘The Pincohet Judgment: New Accountability 
for Old Dictators’ 32 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev (2001) 463; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3; Wedgwood, 
‘International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet’ 40 Va J. Int’l L. (1999-2000) 829; White, ‘Pinochet, 
Universal Jurisdiction, and Impunity’ 7 Sw.J.L & Trade Am (2000) 209. 
248 Cassese, supra note 6 at 16. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Goldstone, ‘Future of International Criminal Justice: Thirteenth Annual Frank.M. Coffin Lecture on 
Law and Public Service’ 57 Me. L. Rev. (2005) 554 
251 See ‘Developments – International Criminal Law’, supra note 237 at 1950.  The relevant law here is 
‘Hague Law’ and ‘Geneva Law’.  ‘Hague Law’ governed the conduct of war.  The Hague Peace 
Conferences produced the 1899 Hague Conventions I – III and the 1907 Hague Convention 1-XIII.  ‘Hague 
Law’ and ‘Geneva Law’ are treaty-based law, however, their enactment did not inhibit the evolution of 
CIL, as indicated by the Martens clause within the Hague Convention IV: 
‘Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it 
expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public 
conscience.’  See ‘Developments – International Criminal Law’ ibid.   
‘Geneva Law’ concerned the treatment of the sick and the wounded.  The relevant Conventions are: the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (Convention I); the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention II); Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III) and the Geneva Convention Relative the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV).  For a discussion of ‘Geneva Law’ see:  Schlögel, 
‘Geneva Red Cross Conventions and Protocols’ Encyclopedia of Public International Law 531. 
252‘Developments – International Criminal Law’ ibid.  
253 Ibid at 1951; Goldstone, supra note 250.  For a discussion of the formation of the International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokyo see:  Cassese, supra note 6 at 376. 
 39
in enforcement of international criminal law, both internationally and domestically.254 
The establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals marked the renewed sense of vigour in the 
enforcement of international criminal norms.  
 
The slow development of international criminal law may be attributed to the 
inherent tensions between ascending law, in the shape of state sovereignty, and 
descending law, characterised by prohibitive criminal norms.255 However, the application 
of customary international criminal law norms presents more than mere theoretical 
problems.  I previously identified the complexities in ascertaining what state practice 
actually is.256  The practical difficulties of applying the bi-partite doctrine seem even 
more pronounced in the case of international criminal law.  
 
In the sphere of international criminal law, much of the regulated conduct 
concerns the actions of the military.  Military activity is purposely kept from public 
scrutiny, for professed reasons of national security and state interest.257 Thus, discerning 
when a breach of international criminal law has occurred is not a simple task.  
Furthermore, the only possible means of delimiting state practice is through examining 
how states respond to the individuals who have allegedly breached international criminal 
law.  The crucial question here is: do states prosecute those alleged to have committed an 
international crime? However, if in the first instance the breaches in question are kept 
from public scrutiny, it would seem extremely difficult to actually ascertain any form of 
state response. In effect, it is not practically feasible to discern the actual content of state 
practice.  It is arguable that establishing the existence of the subjective element in the 
realm of international criminal law is a far more attractive prospect, both in terms of 
theory and practice.  
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The ‘explosion’ of the enforcement of international criminal law has resulted in a 
plethora of unanswered questions in the application of customary international criminal 
law.  It is clear that the current definition is utterly unsuitable, in terms of theory and in 
terms of the practicality of its application.  I hope to re-imagine a definition of CIL in 
which state practice becomes an entirely epiphenomenal concern.  However, in order to 
advance such a definition, it is necessary carefully to delimit opinio juris.  Is it possible to 
exact a definition of CIL that enables the international judiciary coherently to apply 
norms of customary international criminal law? 
ii) Re-imagining Customary International Law  
 
Before endeavouring to re-cast the definition of CIL, an in depth enquiry into 
Koskenniemi’s criticism of the CIL doctrine is instructive.258  Koskenniemi characterizes 
the inherent tension prevalent in the formation of CIL.259  He details a dichotomy of 
theoretical frailty in CIL norm creation between the concepts of apology and utopia:  
 
A law which would lack distance from state behaviour, will or interest would 
amount to a non-normative apology, a mere sociological description.  A law 
which would base itself on principles which are unrelated to state behaviour, will 
or interest would seem utopian, incapable of demonstrating its own content in any 
reliable way.260
 
 In effect, doctrines of CIL can be termed apologetic if they constitute a mere description 
of what states do.261  The absence of a normative standard seems to indicate a process of 
norm-creation more akin to a sociological enquiry than a method of delimiting coherent 
legal norms.262  As previously asserted, it is often thought that the traditional models of 
CIL delimitation – relying principally upon the practice of states – are steeped in 
apologetic leanings.263   
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On the other hand, a doctrine of norm-creation may be cast as utopian if it fails to 
relate to the reality of international legal relations.264  A methodology of CIL concerned 
solely with normative standards – what the practice ought to be – may be termed utopian 
as it bears no relation to the practice of states in question. 265    Description and 
normativity, under Koskenniemi’s reasoning, appear to be inversely related to one 
another.    
 
This is starkly illustrated by the fact that the criticisms of the divergent 
approaches – apologetic and utopian – correspond inversely. 266 The modern approach, 
cast as utopian, cannot be described as apologist – it is not a mere reflection of what 
states do.  Whereas the traditional approach, cast as apologist, is not utopian – it cannot 
be said to be distinct from the reality of international legal relations.  In effect, the key 
criticism of each of the doctrines (utopian or apologist) constitutes the value upheld in the 
opposing doctrine.267 Modern theories of custom are not apologist and are, consequently, 
utopian.  Traditional theories of CIL formation are not utopian and are, consequently, 
apologist. In this sense, the divergent criticism the doctrines attract cannot exist 
independently and thus, neither can the opposing approaches to CIL formation – they are 
inversely related.268  
 
Because indeterminate, customary law doctrine can only produce solutions which 
remain vulnerable to the criticisms compelled by itself.  Any proposed solution – 
that is, any attempt to cease the shifting of perspectives at some point – will have 
to appear either apologist (because it prefers psychology to behaviour) or utopian 
(as it privileges behaviour over psychology).269
 
 
In their attempt to exist independently of one another, description (a reliance upon 
state practice) and normativity (a reliance upon opinio juris) resemble different ends of a 
tightly stretched elastic band.  The more description and normativity struggle to become 
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utterly independent of one another, the more likely they are to collapse back into one 
another.  They thus form not the intended dichotomy along a straight line, or in Kirgis’ 
terms a sliding scale, but an entirely circular doctrine.  Instead of labouring under the 
pretence that Article 38, whether examined through a modern approach (representing 
utopia) or a traditional approach (representing apology), is a workable legal definition, I 
intend to entirely re-construct the definition of CIL outside of the bounds of Article 38.   
As a formula, I would express my conception as follows: 
 
OPINIO JURIS  +  LEGITIMATE EXPECTION OF THE COMMUNITY OF       
        STATES 
 
= A NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 First and foremost, I intend to collapse description (state practice) into 
normativity (opinio juris), allowing the aforementioned elastic band to recoil and thus, 
abruptly ending the failing attempts to reason along a straight line. In effect, I am 
surrendering to the reality of circular reasoning; opinio juris and state practice cannot and 
should not exist independently of one another.  In re-imaging the definition of CIL, the 
first constituent element of CIL is opinio juris; the material element (state practice) 
becomes a merely epiphenomenal phenomenon.  Its largely diminished role, as I will go 
on to discuss, will simply be as one of the many sources used to evidence the existence, 
or otherwise, of opinio juris.  
 
Koskenniemi would be utterly correct in asserting that this is an entirely utopian 
approach.270  However, I make no apology for the fact that CIL norms, under the re-
imagined definition, are utopian and do not reflect what states do.  Moreover, the second 
element in the re-imagined definition of CIL – legitimate expectation of the global 
community of states – prevents the definition being cast as utterly utopian.  Legitimate 
expectation of the global community of states is a new addition to the delimitation of 
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CIL.271  For present purposes, legitimate expectation constitutes a normative belief, held 
in common by the global community of states that a certain pattern of behaviour is 
legally required.272 Subsequently, a normative reliance is formed upon the basis of this 
communal belief.    
 
To all intents and purposes legitimate expectation of the global community of 
states can be seen as a form of communal opinio juris.273  It is, thus, imperative to 
distinguish the first and second elements of the re-imagined definition.  Whilst legitimate 
expectation is a form of communal opinio juris, it is entirely distinct from the first 
element.  This is largely due to the fact they exist on different planes.  Opinio juris, as 
understood in the first element, is realised individually.  Whilst opinio juris, as 
understood within the context of the global community of states, is held by states in 
common.   Moreover, it is the subsequent effect of the existence of the communal opinio 
juris that is fundamental – the resultant normative reliance. 
 
An instructive analogy may be drawn here between domestic criminal law and 
international criminal law.  A note of caution is essential here: such an analogy ignores 
the relationship between individuals in international criminal law and moreover, it must 
be asserted that domestic criminal law and international criminal law are distinct.274   
Bearing this in mind, domestically, if the law were to constitute a mirror image of how 
the subjects of the domestic legal sphere behaved, criminal law could no longer be 
termed as constraining and descending law. 275   Furthermore, criminal law would 
ultimately fail in its professed purpose.276  In order that such an unfavourable outcome be 
avoided, the principles and prohibitions in the criminal law should reflect a common set 
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of shared standards.277    International customary criminal law, by its very nature, ought 
to be utopian.  It should reflect what the law ought to be.  I would maintain that this does 
not serve to disconnect law from reality.  The resultant reality is that states break the law.  
International customary law should reflect what individual states and the global 
community of states perceive the law to be, not how they act. 
a) The Role of Opinio Juris in the Re-imagined Definition of CIL 
 
In order that opinio juris constitute the core of the re-imagined definition of CIL, both in 
theoretical terms and in order that the doctrine can be applied practically, it is absolutely 
essential to detail the parameters of opinio juris.  What exactly is opinio juris and how 
does one prove its existence or otherwise? For present purposes, opinio juris is a sense of 
legal obligation.278  In effect, it is the belief of a state that a certain norm, omission, 
prohibition or action is legal in character.   
 
But it is sometimes enough to believe in love for it to exist. Why can the belief in 
the existence of a norm on the part of a state, which is simultaneously the subject 
and creator of international law, not be at the origin of the emergence of such a 
norm?279
 
It is essential to re-iterate that opinio juris is not the will that something become the 
law280 or a mistaken belief that a certain norm is prescribed by the law.281  It solely 
constitutes a belief that the law necessitates the state behaviour, or state action, at point.  
It is, therefore, crucial to delimit how such a belief is evidenced.  Perhaps opinio juris is 
not as ‘elusive’ as some theorists maintain.282
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I would aver that the resultant effect of collapsing description (state practice) into 
normativity (opinio juris) is that opinio juris is more a lucid and coherent element in CIL 
norm-creation.  A coherent doctrine would enable the judiciary, both domestically and 
internationally, to undertake empirical enquiries when determining the existence and 
applicability of CIL norms. As such, domestic legislation, national judicial decisions, 
statements, involvement in – or indeed abstention from - international conventions, 
voting patterns at the GA, may all constitute evidence of opinio juris.  It is noteworthy, 
that opinio juris cannot be expressed as actually subsisting in any of the aforementioned 
phenomena.  For example, opinio juris could not be said to actually be located within the 
realm of state behaviour.  Such state behaviour could, and should, only constitute 
evidence of the existence opinio juris.  In the same way that a bloodstained knife cannot 
be said to constitute the crime of murder, it could merely be detailed as evidence of the 
existence the crime; the same principle would apply when one wishes to prove the 
existence of opinio juris.   
 
 The re-imagined definition may also be criticised for being apologetic as 
ultimately CIL is created by what states perceive the law ought to be.  As such, the re-
imagined definition may be accused of enabling the formation of ‘bad’ law.  In effect, if 
the law is constructed largely around what states believe the law is there can be no 
accountability mechanism vis-à-vis the creation of law that may be deemed morally 
irreprehensible.283  It may be argued that, under the re-imagination of CIL, it is possible 
for a CIL norm to emerge permitting behaviour contrary to accepted standards. The 
pertinent examples here are Nazi Germany and Rwanda.   
 
However, I would submit that in carrying out morally irreprehensible acts more often 
than not states ignore the law entirely.284  Justifications for state behaviour are couched in 
terms of necessity, security or morality.  In the context of Rwanda, which saw the 
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 46
slaughter of some 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus in three months, the law remained 
unchanged.285  I would maintain that it is extremely unlikely that a state actor, or an 
individual, would truly believe that the law permitted the commission of a genocidal act 
or war crime.  As such, the foundation for the creation of a norm of CIL, opinio juris, 
could not be said to exist.  The far more likely scenario is that whilst ‘acting’ states, or 
individuals, appeal to seeming moral or sociological justifications for their actions 
ignoring the law entirely. 286  Whilst these factors may impact upon law creation, or 
constitute the reasoning behind the creation of a particular law, they cannot be said to be 
tantamount to law itself.  The other possibility is that states, in attempting to justify their 
actions, may erroneously apply CIL.  
 
Furthermore, even if this assertion proved incorrect in a specific instance - a state or 
an individual in carrying out, for example, a genocidal act truly had the requisite opinio 
juris, the second element in the reformulation of CIL – the global legitimate expectation - 
would act as a safety net barring the creation of such a norm.  In effect, the legal reality 
of these given situations would be that states or individuals concerned were acting 
contrary to international customary criminal norms and consequently, the appropriate 
criminal enforcement mechanisms should be employed.  The reality, once again, does not 
serve to invalidate the existence of a legal norm but simply illustrate that customary 
international criminal law norms are broken.  Perhaps, here, the weak link in the 
functioning of customary criminal law norms would simply be the criminal enforcement 
mechanisms and not the method of norm-creation itself. 
  
 The overt reliance on opinio juris may have other theoretical frailties. Can we 
really aver that a state can hold a psychological belief? 287   It is perhaps a flawed 
presumption that a nation state, as a social construct, can hold a common sense of legal 
belief. 
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Such an argument, however, is not really a psychological one at all… [it] is based 
on the naturalistic assumption that a nation has an intelligible essence.288
 
I submit that it is possible for a state, in the abstract, to hold a subjective belief.  It is 
noteworthy, that in delimiting the novel parameters of CIL I purposely avoid using the 
term ‘morality’ and do not refer to natural law principles.  This is largely because I would 
maintain that a nation state cannot be said to have a common morality.  However, a state 
can be said to hold a set of shared legal principles and acceptable standards of behaviour. 
Such beliefs can be classed as subjective and thus, a state is indeed capable of 
psychological belief in the delimitation of customary legal norms.   
 
(b) The Role of Legitimate Expectation in the Re-imagined Definition of CIL 
 
As previously asserted, the second element I propound, in re-casting the CIL 
definition, is one that is absent from the definition as exacted in Article 38.289 Despite its 
absence from the traditional bi-partite doctrine, some theorists argue that legitimate 
expectation is fundamental to custom formation.290  In fact, Byers states that legitimate 
expectation is at the ‘heart of all customary and treaty rules.’291   Byers does not appear 
to couch legitimate expectation in terms of a form of communal opinio juris and seems to 
suggest that it already has a defined role on the international plane.   
 
[T]he principle of legitimate expectation means that states are legally justified in 
relying on each other to behave consistently with previous assurances or patterns 
of behaviour – if those assurances or that behaviour is of a type, and takes place 
within a context, such that it is considered legally relevant by most if not all 
states.292  
 
The foundations of the principle of legitimate expectation in international law 
seem to be located in the German historical school of thought represented by Savigny and 
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Ranke. 293  Koskenniemi avers that a principle similar to legitimate expectation was 
prevalent among jurists in the middle of the nineteenth century and argues that such a 
principle reduces CIL to a set of bi-lateral agreements.294   However, it is possible to 
draw a clear distinction between legitimate expectation as discussed by Koskenniemi and 
the content of legitimate expectation in the re-imagination of CIL.  In the context of the 
re-imagination of CIL, legitimate expectation is held in community and not, as 
understood by Koskenniemi, by individual state actors.295  Therefore, no bi-lateralism 
could be said to exist.    How does one prove the existence of such a common belief and, 
at the same time avoid criticism of relying on principles of morality? 
  
   Under the re-imagined definition of CIL, non-state actors would have a crucial 
role in proving the existence of a legitimate expectation of the community of states. Such 
a role would only be reserved for non-state actors that are instituted through the 
membership of nation states.296   The expanding nature of the global community and 
moreover, the shifting focus of international legal relations, serves to indicate that non-
state actors should have a role in CIL formation.297  Any definition of CIL that disregards 
the role of non-state actors is one that is entirely disconnected from the reality of 
international legal relations and as such may be criticised as utopian.   
 
 Under the re-imagined definition of CIL, legitimate expectation and subsequent 
actual reliance may be evidenced through the Declarations, statements, Memorandums 
and Resolutions of non-state actors.  For example, a Resolution of the UN GA may 
constitute evidence of a global legitimate expectation.  However, once again it is essential 
to note that a UN GA Resolution, in and of itself, cannot constitute a legitimate 
expectation (communal opinio juris).  It can simply constitute the evidence of the 
existence of a global legitimate expectation.  Koskenniemi argues that, if CIL is to reflect 
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the will of the global community, it is in danger of being utterly apologist.298  He states 
that CIL would be subject to the changing ‘whims’ of state belief.299  However, I would 
maintain that a reliance upon individual opinio juris and, the delimited form of communal 
opinio juris, is far less likely to be subject to capricious change than a reliance on state 
practice, particularly when legitimate expectation and subsequent actual reliance are 
entrenched within the doctrine.    
 
It is essential to re-iterate in exacting a definition encapsulating a collective 
legitimate expectation, I do not intend to suggest that there exists a shared morality on the 
international plane. 300   It is impossible to assert that there exists a common, or shared, 
morality among the global community of states.301  In fact, it would seem incredible to 
assert that a common morality can exist within an individual nation state.302  
 
It is difficult, therefore, to see how shared consciousnesses could exist in respect 
of the substantive content of each and every rule of customary international law, 
especially those rules of a highly technical character.303  
 
Law and morality must be understood as entirely different concepts.  Whilst there can be 
no common morality, there can be an agreement, held in common, upon a set of shared 
standards of behaviour – particularly in realm of international criminal law.  Such 
agreement, for these purposes, evidences the existence of a psychological belief on the 
behalf of states.  In propounding a definition of CIL that focuses entirely upon normative 
standards – individual and collective – I make no apology for international customary law 
not reflecting what states do.   International customary law, particularly international 
customary criminal law, should reflect what the law ought to be.  As such, the reality of 
international customary relations lies in normativity – both individual and communal – in 
effect, what states believe the law is.  Ultimately the reality of international legal relations 
is that states, and individuals, break the law and for that they should be held accountable. 
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 How is such a definition of CIL to be reconciled with notions of state sovereignty 
and international legal theory?  It seems that any re-imagination of the CIL necessarily 
involves, even at a subconscious level, an attack on the theoretical foundations of the 
international legal system. 
 
Indeed, to question its [CIL’s] veracity might well be regarded as tantamount to a 
heretical attack on the fundamental beliefs and dogma of the creed, shaking, if not 
destroying, the very foundations on which international law is built.304  
 
As I will go on to discuss re-casting the definition of CIL leaves the notion of state 
sovereignty intact.  Such a definition is reconcilable with international legal theory.  In 
effect, if the definition of CIL is not challenged and ultimately re-constructed, CIL will 
be rendered an ineffectual doctrine; a doctrine left in the wake of multilateral treaty 
conclusion.   
 
iii) Reconciling a Re-imagined Definition with International Legal Theory 
 
The inherent tension that exists within international criminal law – between constraining 
law and the traditional rhetoric of state sovereignty – must be reconciled in the realm of 
legal theory in order that the re-imagined definition of CIL is theoretically practicable.  
As previously averred, modern approaches to international law have not succeeded in 
unseating the traditional rhetoric of state centred legal relations.305  It is noteworthy, that 
within the re-imagined definition of CIL, the state still remains the foundation of norm 
formation.  However, the emphasis upon normative standards, and in particular the 
reference to collective normative standards, must be reconciled with traditional concepts 
of state sovereignty.   The need to reconcile this inherent tension is even more 
pronounced within international criminal law. 
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It is apparent the international criminal justice system does not yet seem to have 
asserted any independent justification for its existence.306  It is essential that justifications 
for the existence of the international criminal justice system are forged and are entirely 
independent of the justifications employed in the domestic criminal sphere.307
 
Rather than remaining a mere substitution for or complementary helping hand of a 
national system, international criminal law is building a fortress of its own, with it 
own laws and policy.308
 
However, until such a theoretical ‘fortress’ is advanced, an examination of the 
justifications employed in the domestic sphere may be inevitable.  However, once again, 
a note of caution is essential here: such an analogy ignores the relationship between 
individuals in international criminal law and moreover, it must be stated that domestic 
criminal law and international criminal law are distinct legal spheres.309   
 
From a purely legal construction, the domestic criminal justice system enables 
governments to afford protection to their citizens.310  Domestic criminal law seeks to 
control the types of behaviour that society finds to be unacceptable and, to all intents and 
purposes, protect citizens of the state from harm.311 Can the emerging global criminal 
justice system be expected to perform the same function?  If the emerging international 
criminal justice system is to be viewed in such a light an examination of the contractarian 
theory instructive. 
 
The reasoning behind the application of the contractarian theory in international 
legal relations is directly related to the existence of a global community.  Franck, whilst 
discussing ‘fairness’ in international law, states that substantive ‘fairness’ may only be 
achieved through reference to the global international community.312  
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It is only by reference to a community’s evolving standards of what constitutes 
right process that it is possible to assert meaningfully that a law, or an executive 
order, or a court’s judgment, or a citizen’s claim on a compatriot, or a 
government’s claim on its citizen, is legitimate.313
 
I submit that the re-imagined definition of CIL embraces the notion of fairness within the 
second composite part of the definition – the legitimate expectation of the global 
community of states.  In theoretical terms, the concept of fairness aside, the involvement 
of the global community of states and the subsequent reference to normative standards 
within the re-imagined definition of CIL, can be justified by reference to the social 
contract.314  The traditional understanding of contractarian theory is that it is applicable 
to the creation of a community by persons.315  The theory, however, does appear to be 
equally applicable to the creation of a community by states.316   
  
It is self-evident that contractarian theory readily explains the origins, if not the 
modern nature, of international law and organization.317   
 
In the traditional conception of social contract theory, persons, by nature, are born 
free and equal.318  However, the human predicament rests upon the reality of competition 
– others exist who are in possession of the same rights.319  Restrictions on individual 
freedom are only as a result of agreement to divest some of one’s autonomy with a 
central power.320  The purpose of such divestment is to ensure the protection of one’s 
vital interests. 321   A clear analogy may be drawn here with the international 
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community.322  States, by nature, are constructed as free and equal, however, in order to 
protect their vital interests they enter into the global community of states and as such, 
divest part of their sovereign power in a  central authority – in this case the global 
community of states. An illustration of such a central authority may be the Security 
Council. Halberstam suggests that the Security Council functions as a cosset mechanism 
upholding the principles state sovereignty.323
 
If we understand international legal relations in terms of the social contract, the 
re-imagined definition of CIL may be reconciled with notions of state sovereignty.  States 
still form the basis of all international legal relations but in order to subsist on the 
international plane their sovereignty cannot be absolute. In order for CIL to function 
effectively states are bound by CIL, if one uses contractarian theory, to protect their 
interests.  Peaceful co-existence internationally is dependent upon the social contract and 
the assertion that sovereignty cannot be an absolute concept.   
 
Whilst international criminal law is cast as descending and constraining law,324 
under the re-imagined definition of CIL, states still shape its creation.  It is true to say 
that non-state actors hold a key role in the re-imagined definition of CIL and moreover, 
they can shape norm creation.  However, as previously asserted such non-state actors are 
in reality state based organisations.  Reliance on normativity does not undermine notions 
of sovereignty - the re-imagined definition of CIL simply looks to what states believe 
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CHAPTER IV – The Practical Application of Customary International Criminal 
Law Norms: The Need for a Novel Defintion 
 
An examination of contemporary judicial employment of customary international 
criminal law is essential, in order to assess the possible impact of the application of the 
re-imagined definition in prosecuting international crime.  To this end, I intend to discuss 
the application of customary international criminal law norms domestically and 
internationally. Such an examination serves to indicate the need for a novel definition of 
CIL and moreover, illustrate that the re-imagined definition of CIL constitutes an entirely 
appropriate methodology.   
 
Proving the existence of a rule of customary international criminal law under the 
traditional bi-partite doctrine faces an insurmountable obstacle from the offset – very 
little state practice exists.325 Within the re-imagined definition of CIL the emphasis is 
entirely upon normative standards – state practice is a merely epiphenomenal 
phenomenon.326  I submit the re-imagined definition’s emphasis on normativity, within 
the first constituent element (opinio juris) and the second constituent element (legitimate 
expectation of the global community of states), serves to enable the judiciary – both 
domestically and international – coherently to delimit norms of customary international 
criminal law. 
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Within contemporary judicial reasoning, norms of customary international criminal 
law tend to be simply stated and no form of empirical enquiry is apparent.327  I would 
submit that such judicial oversight is directly related to the frailties of the traditional bi-
partite definition.  In effect, asserting the positive existence of a rule of customary 
international criminal law is an almost impossible task. Envisaging the application of the 
re-imagined definition, within the context of the domestic and international spheres, 
serves to illustrate why the re-imagined definition of CIL is both practically and 
theoretically sound. 
 
i) Customary International Criminal Law and its Domestic Application 
 
As previously asserted, the so-called ‘explosion’ of international criminal law 
enforcement is not only present on the international plane; the role of domestic courts as 
an enforcement mechanism is increasingly important. 328  Thus, it is essential to delimit 
this role in the application of customary international criminal law norms.329  The number 
of domestic prosecutions, involving the application of international criminal law, has 
risen sharply.330 Here, the pertinent example is Rwanda; there have been a vast number 
of domestic prosecutions for genocide over and above the work of the ICTR.331 National 
courts have been described by some jurists as constituting the ‘front line’ of international 
criminal enforcement.332 Moreover, Alvarez submits that domestic courts are the proper 
fora for prosecution of international crime.333
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The seeming importance of domestic prosecution has been further entrenched by 
the inception of the ICC.334  Article 1 of the Rome Statute clearly affirms the role of 
domestic prosecution: ‘[the Court] shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.’335 The principle of complementarity is a key principle in the design of the 
ICC and is further detailed within Article 17 of the Statute.336  As such, a case will not be 
admissible before the ICC if a bona fide investigation or prosecution has been undertaken 
by a state - regardless of whether or not that state is party to the Statute - that has 
jurisdiction over the crime in question. 337   Charney suggests that the principle of 
complementarity may result in a very small number of prosecutions before the ICC.338  If 
this assertion proves to be correct and ultimately, domestic courts are to constitute the 
cornerstone of international criminal law enforcement, questions surrounding the 
definition of customary international criminal law seem even more pertinent.  In effect, 
how will domestic courts undertake the unenviable task of applying norms of customary 
international criminal law?   
 
‘To do so, municipal courts will have to apply the level of legal analysis hitherto 
used in municipal legal cases to international criminal law.’339
 
An examination of the application of international customary criminal law in the 
domestic sphere is illustrative of the need to re-imagine the definition of CIL.  The 
traditional bi-partite doctrine, floundering in definitional difficulties, is inadequate within 
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the realm of judicial practice.  Here, an examination of the Pinochet case is instructive.340 
The Pinochet Judgement endeavoured, albeit rather unconvincingly, to deal with the 
application of customary international criminal law.341  The case arose as a result of a 
Spanish attempt to extradite Pinochet from the UK for crimes he allegedly committed 
whilst Head of State in Chile. 342   The crimes allegedly committed ‘in Chile and 
elsewhere in the world [were]: torture, murder and the unexplained disappearances of 
individuals, all on a large scale.’343  The Judgment had two main focal points – the 
concepts of extradition and state sovereignty.344  However, for present purposes, it is the 
Court’s discussion of the international crime of torture and the employment of customary 
international criminal law norms that is crucial.  An examination of the somewhat 
convoluted reasoning employed by the Law Lords in discussing the crime of torture is 
indicative of the need for a novel definition of CIL.345
 
Lord Millet recognised that torture was an international crime and consequently, 
that it attracted universal jurisdiction.346  However, the six other Law Lords seemed to 
accept that status of torture as an international crime but failed to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over the crime. 347  Thus, the case was largely decided in the realm of 
domestic law.348  Within the text of the Judgment, when customary international law is 
mentioned, there is no empirical enquiry into its existence.349  Its existence is simply 
stated - largely through pointing to norms entrenched within International 
Conventions. 350   The House of Lords, in discussing sovereign immunity and state 
sovereignty, seemingly relied upon state practice in delimiting the existence of customary 
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international criminal law.351  However, at no point in the Judgment are the parameters of 
state practice discerned.352  Moreover, Powell and Pillay point to the fact that there is 
‘little to no state practice’ on the extradition of former Heads of State.353
 
The Court did not recognise the distinction between norms of CIL and treaty-
based norms. 354   In fact, discussion of the divergent concepts tended to be lumped 
together in somewhat of an incomprehensible fashion.355 Lord Millet and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson did look to the distinction between CIL and treaty-based norms.356 However, 
the drawing of such a distinction did not appear to impress upon their Judgments.357 The 
Law Lords failed coherently to delimit and apply the principles of customary 
international criminal law.   Perhaps the impracticability of the traditional bi-partite 
doctrine is to blame.  
 
‘The Law Lord’s neglect of customary international law becomes more 
understandable if we take cognisance of the complexity and internal 
contradictions of this body of law.’358   
 
As I discuss below, the re-imagined definition of CIL would ultimately allow domestic 
courts coherently and concisely to apply principles of customary international criminal 
law. 
 
Another instance of a domestic judicial ‘enquiry’ into principles of customary 
international criminal law is S –v-Petane. 359  Interestingly, the aforementioned case 
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actually detailed the divergent elements of CIL.360  In doing so, however, the Court 
merely pointed to the fact that a CIL norm had not emerged.361   I would submit that 
frailties of traditional bi-partite definition make such a decision inevitable.  Under the 
traditional bi-partite doctrine, the uncertainties persisting within each divergent elements 
of the doctrine and moreover, the endemic doubt over which element of the doctrine is to 
be favoured, make it practically impossible to assert the positive existence of a CIL norm.  
In effect, when domestic courts wish to assert a rule of CIL they simply state its 
existence.  However, when a domestic court wishes to aver that a rule of CIL does not 
exist, the impracticality of the current definition facilitates such a conclusion. An 
examination of domestic judicial decisions simply re-iterates the need for a re-imagined 
definition of CIL.  Such a definition must be both easily discernible and practical in its 
application.  
 
 The methodology, or lack thereof, employed by the Law Lords in Pinochet No.3 
is indicative of the practical advantages in applying the re-imagined definition of CIL.362 
How would the Law Lords have positively proven the existence of a norm of customary 
international criminal law under the re-imagined definition of CIL?  By way of 
illustration, I shall focus upon the delimitation of the international crime of torture. The 
re-imagined definition of CIL collapses description (state practice) into normativity 
(opinio juris) and as such, the resultant effect is a doctrine that quite clearly favours 
normative standards.363  In practical terms, how would the novel bi-partite definition – 
constituting opinio juris and legitimate expectation - be proven?   
 
For present purposes, I will illustrate how the positive existence of torture as an 
international crime may be proven under the re-imagined definition.  First and foremost, 
it is essential to note the date of the alleged offences.  In 1973, Pinochet, then the 
Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, lead a military coup snatching power from 
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Salvador Allende.364 He was subsequently appointed president and remained in power 
until 1990 – it is during his seventeen year long rule that the alleged atrocities, including 
that of torture, occurred.365  These dates are of significance as the Torture Convention did 
not enter into force until 1987 and the UK did not ratify the Convention until 1988.366  In 
essence, there is a significant period of time whereby the conventional norm is 
inapplicable to the atrocities allegedly committed by Pinochet.  However, I submit that 
employing the novel definition of CIL would serve to indicate that a customary 
international criminal prohibition on torture may have come into existence at a much 
earlier date.   
 
The first element of the re-imagined definition is opinio juris – a belief by a state 
that a certain norm or prohibition is legal in character.  As previously averred, domestic 
legislation, national judicial decisions, statements of belief, involvement in – or 
abstention from – international conventions and voting patterns at the GA may all 
constitute evidence of the existence of opinio juris. 367   For present purposes, I will 
examine whether or not the United Kingdom had the requisite opinio juris, from 1972 
onwards, for a prohibitive customary international criminal law norm to exist.   
 
In proving the existence of opinio juris the Law Lords, using the re-imagined 
definition, could have examined the case of Ireland – v- United Kingdom.368  The case at 
point involved an Irish application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to 
ensure that the UK observed its obligations under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 369  with respect to Northern 
Ireland.  The allegations against the UK concerned its treatment of persons in custody 
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and specifically, the methods of interrogation employed. 370   The Irish Government 
alleged that the UK had breached Article 3 of the European Convention.371  The ECHR 
ultimately decided, in reference to the claims brought under Article 3, that the actions of 
the UK government did not amount to amount to torture.372  However, the behaviour of 
the British Government could most certainly be held as evidence of the existence of the 
requisite opinio juris.  Both the British Prime Minister and the Attorney-General stated 
that such methods of interrogation would no longer be employed and made specific 
reference to Article 3 of the European Convention.373  
 
The Government of the United Kingdom have considered the question of the use 
of the ‘five techniques’ with very great care and with particular regard to Article 3 
of the Convention.  They now give this unqualified undertaking, that the ‘five 
techniques’ will not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to 
interrogation.374
 
I would submit that this is simply one example of evidence the Law Lords could have 
employed, under the re-imagined definition of CIL, as an indication of the existence of 
the requisite opinio juris for the creation of a prohibitive norm of CIL.375
 
 As previously asserted, evidence of the existence of the second element in the re-
imagined definition –legitimate expectation of the global community of states – may be 
found in Declarations, statements, Memorandums and Resolutions of state-instituted non-
state actors.376  In proving the existence of the second element of the novel definition, the 
Law Lords could have had recourse to a wealth of international conventions condemning 
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torture. For example, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly 
denounces torture. 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment.377  
 
Other examples of such provisions the Law Lords could have employed are: Article 3 of 
the ECHR, 378  Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)379 and Article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights.380
Once again reference to such provisions, could only be said to constitute evidence of 
the existence of a legitimate expectation of the global community of states (communal 
opinio juris). The emphasis, within the re-imagined definition of CIL, upon normative 
standards would enable the judiciary to undertake the much-needed substantive empirical 
enquires into the existence of customary international criminal law norms.  If the 
domestic judiciary are to play such a crucial role in international criminal law 
enforcement, they must be given the apposite tools for norm delimitation.  Otherwise 
instead of strengthening international criminal law enforcement, the domestic judiciary – 
in their failing attempts to delimit customary international criminal law norms - will be in 
danger of weakening substantive international criminal law.381   
 
ii) Customary International Criminal Law and Nuremberg 
 
On the 8th August 1945 the London Charter was signed leading to the inception of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and paving the way for the 
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prosecution of the Nazi leadership.382 As previously asserted, the IMT can be described 
as the first international criminal tribunal.383  The IMT has been viewed by the majority 
of jurists as a bastion of justice. 384  However, the formation of the Tribunal and its 
subsequent Judgment, has attracted a degree of criticism.  
 
I have never been comfortable with the moral/legal authority and the legitimacy 
of the Nuremberg Trials, with its philosophical underpinnings of positive law and 
legal positivism, its judicial outcomes and that look askance at legal/moral 
constructs such as vengeance, the unity of legality and morality, right and wrong, 
good and evil.385  
  
Before examining the Tribunal’s somewhat sparse discussion of customary international 
law, it is necessary to place the Judgment within its historical framework. 
 
  Under a contemporary understanding, the global community of states – as 
delimited within the second constituent element of the re-imagined definition – could 
really only be described as being in the stage of infancy at the time of the Nuremberg 
Judgment.386  It is noteworthy, that whilst the date of the Nuremberg Judgment most 
certainly impacted upon the substantive international criminal law norms, the sources 
applied in delimiting these norms are no different to those employed in the contemporary 
judicial setting.387  
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The twenty-one defendants before the Tribunal were charged with crimes against 
the peace (aggression), war crimes and crimes against humanity.388  The reasoning within 
the text of the Judgment was largely concerned with delimiting the crimes as detailed 
within the text of Nuremberg Charter.389 However, a careful reading of the Judgment 
illustrates that cursory references were made to CIL throughout.  An examination of the 
methodology employed by the Tribunal, in its fleeting discussion of customary 
international criminal law norms, is indicative of the need for a re-imagination of the 
definition of CIL. 
 
The first crime detailed within the Nuremberg Statute, over which the Tribunal 
had jurisdiction, was crimes against the peace.390 In delimiting the parameters of the 
crime the Tribunal examined the Hague Conventions of 1809 and 1907,391 Versailles 
Treaty392 and the Kellog-Briand Pact.393 However, a passing reference was made to CIL 
within the text of the Judgment:  
 
In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that 
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment of one of the rules of the 
Hague Convention.’394  
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389The Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 382 at 172. 
390 Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, supra note 376 detailed crimes against the peace as: ‘planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing.’ 
391 For a discussion of Hague Law see, note 251 
392 Versailles Treaty, 28th June 1919, 13 AJIL (sup 15/385) (1919) 
393 The Kellog Briand Pact of 27th August 1928, 94 INTS 57, proclaimed July 24th 1929.  See, the 
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 382 at pg 212 –221. 
394 The Nuremberg Judgment, ibid  at 219. 
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Here, the Tribunal seemed to suggest that legal norms, concerning crimes against the 
peace, existed over and above the law of the Hague.  However, no empirical enquiry into 
the existence of these norms was apparent and moreover, there was no indication of the 
apparent source of such norms.  In fact, it may be rather presumptuous to assume that the 
Tribunal was referring to norms of customary international criminal law at all.   However, 
whilst still referring to crimes against peace, the Tribunal articulated a somewhat clearer 
reference to CIL.  To all intents and purposes, the Tribunal detailed the formation of 
custom under the traditional bi-partite doctrine but failed to translate such detail in the 
delimitation of customary international criminal law norms.   
 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices 
of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general 
principles of justice applied by jurists and practised by military courts.  This law 
is not static, but by continued adaptation follows the need of a changing world.  
Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define for more 
accurate references the principles of law already existing.395
 
This passage is indicative of the Tribunals reasoning.  Whilst making an empirical 
enquiry into international treaty-based norms and moreover, questioning their validity, 
the Tribunal simply clumsily stated the existence of norms of CIL.  The Tribunal failed to 
establish what these norms actually were and how they would be applicable in the 
context of the Judgment.  In delimiting crimes of war and crimes against humanity the 
Tribunal’s reasoning follows the same pattern. 396   The Tribunal relied, almost 
exclusively, on the principles enshrined within the Nuremberg Charter itself and Hague 
law.397  However, whilst examining the applicability of Hague law to the delimitation of 
war crimes, the Tribunal noted that ‘by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention 
                                                 
395 Ibid. 
396 War crimes are detailed within Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter, supra note 382 as: ‘violations of 
the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder 
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.’ 
Crimes against humanity are described within Article 6(c) as: ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.’ 
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were recognized by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the 
laws and customs of war.’398   Once again, this constitutes a cursory reference to norms 
of customary international criminal law, without any clear explanation of which norms 
the Tribunal are referring to and moreover, how the seeming existence of such norms 
impacted upon the Judgment.  In fact, the Judgment did not seem to recognise that treaty-
based norms and customary norms can co-exist on the international plane. 
 
The Tribunal’s discussion of customary international criminal law norms was 
steeped in natural law arguments and the existence of CIL seemed to be inextricably 
linked to morality. 399  The Tribunal appeared to suggest that international law and 
morality were not distinct and inadvertently collapsed principles of CIL into morality.  In 
discussing the Nuremberg Judgment Finch clearly illustrates this very point. 
 
There could be no more sacred trust than that of upholding the law against 
primitive and barbarous acts of inhumanity which shock the conscience of all 
civilised people and are forbidden by divine as well as human command.400
 
I submit that despite the seeming infancy of the global community of states, the 
Nuremberg Judgment could have employed the re-imagined definition of CIL and as 
such, the Tribunal could have avoided collapsing law and morality.  The novel 
definition’s reliance upon normative standards, how states ought to behave, would 
facilitate a more coherent means of norm delimitation.  
 
State practice in the realm of international criminal law enforcement was 
practically non-existent at the inception of the Nuremberg Tribunal. In fact, Justice 
Robert Jackson stated there was ‘no treaty, precedent or custom’ to determine ‘by what 
                                                                                                                                                 
397 The Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 382 at 248. 
398 Ibid at 249. 
399 For example: ‘the prohibition of aggressive war demanded by the conscience of the world, finds 
expression in the series of pacts and treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred.’  Ibid at 220.  This is 
despite the best intentions of Justice Robert Jackson: The refuge of the defendants can only be their hope 
that international law will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is a crime in the 
moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.’ Opening remarks of Justice Robert Jackson, cited in 
Brudo, supra note 284 at 635. 
400 Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law’ 41 AJIL (1947) 20 at 22. 
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method justice should be done.’401 The re-imagined definition’s reliance upon normative 
standards of behaviour could have facilitated an empirical enquiry into the existence of 
customary international criminal law norms.  Moreover, such an enquiry could have 
remained distinct from morality. How would the Tribunal have proven the positive 
existence of a prohibitive norm of customary international criminal law?  I would 
maintain that such prohibitive norms could have been proven with a far greater degree of 
ease than under the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  This is largely due to the fact that 
under the re-imagined definition of CIL, with the emphasis upon normative standards, it 
would seem that a prohibitive norm of customary international criminal law could emerge 
in somewhat more of an expedient fashion than under the traditional bi-partite doctrine. 
 
It is noteworthy that in the context of Nuremberg, any form of empirical enquiry 
into substantive customary international criminal law would not have the breadth of 
evidentiary sources that a contemporary enquiry would entail.  This is simply as a result 
of the time period in question.    However, such an enquiry could be far more successful 
than an empirical enquiry under the traditional bi-partite doctrine. 
 
By way of example, I shall examine the concept of war crimes and use the United 
States as a model.  In asserting the existence of a prohibitive norm of customary 
international criminal law under the re-imagined definition, evidence of the existence of 
the first element – opinio juris - could have been proven by reference to US domestic 
judicial practice.  At the end of the American Civil War a number of important trials were 
heard by a US Military Commission – the most famous being that of Henry Wirz.402  The 
case in question concerned the ill treatment of prisoners of war.403  This could most 
certainly be said, under the re-imagined definition of CIL, to constitute evidence of the 
existence of opinio juris. In asserting the existence of the second element of the re-
imagined definition – legitimate expectation – the Tribunal could have referred to Hague 
law, which expressly stated that the Conventions constituted a codification of 
                                                 
401 As per Justice Robert Jackson, cited in Cassese, supra note 6 at 376. 
402 Ibid at 39. 
403 Ibid. 
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international law.404  Moreover, it is perhaps arguable that a legitimate expectation, or at 
least an emerging legitimate expectation, was demonstrated by the institution of the IMT 
itself.405
 
I would submit that despite the infancy of the global community states, the re-
imagined definition of CIL could have been employed in the context of Nuremberg with 
a certain degree of success.  The traditional bi-partite definition is particularly ineffective 
in the context of Nuremberg – no substantive state practice could have been held to exist.   
However, the changing nature of the international global community and the evolution of 
substantive international criminal law norms, serves to indicate need for a novel 
definition of CIL.  It seems apparent that the traditional bi-partite definition is just as 
unsuitable today, both in terms of practice and theory, as it was in the context of the 
Nuremberg Judgment.  
 
iii) Customary International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
The establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals has most certainly made a considerable 
contribution to the development of substantive international criminal law and its practical 
application.406 As previously asserted, the inception of the ad hoc Tribunals signified the 
international community’s intention to enforce norms of international criminal law.407  
Today there exists a vast body of judicial jurisprudence concerning the practical 
application of international criminal law.408  How much, if any, of this jurisprudence 
relates to the delimitation of customary international criminal law norms? 
 
                                                 
404 See note 398. 
405 It is noteworthy that I fully recognise that the IMT was instituted by the four Allied powers - see 
Cassese, ibid at 331- and as such, illustrating the existence of a legitimate expectation in the given situation 
would not be without problems.  However, it could be argued that the creation of the IMT constituted an 
emerging legitimate expectation.  
406 See, Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’ 89 AJIL (1995) 554 
407 See, ‘Developments – International Criminal Law’ supra note 237 at 1952.  For a discussion of the 
creation of the ad hoc Tribunals see note 5.  
408 See Charney, supra note 246 at 122. 
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While the statutes do not set out to create new criminal offences but instead purport to 
reference a set of crimes already prohibited under customary international law.409
 
An examination of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals is once again 
indicative of the need for a novel definition of CIL. Within the text of the Judgments 
there appears to be two different trends in the application of customary international 
criminal law.  Firstly, unlike the foregoing examples, an empirical enquiry into the 
existence of CIL norms was actually undertaken. This is illustrated through an 
examination of the Tadic Judgement.410  However, I submit that the reasoning of the 
Appeals Chambers may be called into question. The second trend apparent in 
jurisprudence, as illustrated through an examination of Akayesu, is that norms of CIL are 
simply stated to exist and any form of empirical enquiry is noticeable only by its 
absence.411 The frailties of the traditional definition are starkly illustrated through an 
examination of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and moreover, it is evident that 
under the traditional conception of custom, CIL may only exist as an incoherent and 
intangible source of law. 
 
Tadic was indicted with grave breaches of Geneva Conventions, violations of 
laws and customs of war and crimes against humanity in connection with Articles 2, 3 
and 5 of the ICTY Statute. 412  Subsequently, Tadic filed a motion challenging the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on three grounds.413  For present purposes, it is the third 
                                                 
409 Tomuschat, supra note 4 at 243. 
410 Here, I am concerned with the Appeal on the Jurisdiction: Prosecutor –v- Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 
October 2nd 1995 (Appeal on the Jurisdiction) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal] available at http://www.icty.org , 
last viewed 20th February 2006. 
411 Prosecutor –v- Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2nd September 1998, available at 
http://www.ictr.org , last viewed 20th February 2006.  It is noteworthy that Akayesu was the first genocide 
conviction by an international court.  See: See Gunawaradana, ‘Contributions by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda to the Development of the Definition of Genocide’ 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (2000) 
277. 
412 Prosecutor –v- Tadic Case No. IT-94-1 (February 10th, 1995) (Indictment) available at 
http://www.icty.org, last viewed 20th February 2006. The indictment alleged that at the Omarska detention 
facility Tadic had raped, murdered and assaulted numerous victims, see para 1; para 4.1; para 5.1 ibid.   See 
Corey, ‘The Fine Line Between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor –v- Tadic and the Customary International 
Law of Armed Conflict’ 166 Mil. L. Rev (2000) 145 at 147.  
413 These grounds were: 1) that the Security Council lacked the requisite authority to establish the Tribunal 
and as such its inception was unlawful.  See, Tadic Appeal, supra note 410 at para 8. 2) The primacy 
jurisdiction granted to the Tribunal had no foundation in international law.  See, Tadic Appeal, supra note 
410 at para 8. 3) The Tribunal lacked the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, as the crimes detailed only 
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ground that is of concern. Tadic claimed that the Tribunal did not have the requisite 
subject matter jurisdiction because the crimes in question only related to international 
armed conflict and the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was internal in nature. 414  
However, the Appeals Chamber asserted that the conflict had ‘both internal and 
international aspects’.415  The Appeals Chamber then undertook an extensive discussion 
of the application of CIL in internal armed conflict. 416   Interestingly, the Appeals 
Chamber recognised that treaty-based obligations and customary norms could co-exist on 
the international plane and moreover, be of a differing content.417  However, this did not 
appear to impress upon the Judgment. In fact, in delimiting customary international 
criminal law the Judgment did not fully engage with the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  
 
In determining that CIL norms existed governing internal armed conflict the 
Appeals Chamber relied primarily on ‘such elements as official pronouncements of 
states, military manuals and judicial decisions.’ 418  The Appeals Chamber seemed to 
believe that the evidentiary sources it employed related to the practice of states and it did 
not engage with the subjective element of the traditional bi-partite doctrine.419  As such, 
the Tadic Judgment seemed to endorse the traditional approach in the delimitation of CIL 
norms. The lack of the normative element in asserting the existence of CIL norms renders 
                                                                                                                                                 
related to international conflicts and the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was internal in nature.  See, 
Tadic Appeal, supra note 410 at para 8.  See, Corey, supra note 412 at 148. 
414 See, ibid at para 65 – 145. It is noteworthy that in the Tadic Appeal the Appellant added an alternative 
claim – that there was no ‘legally cognizable armed conflict, see ibid at para 66.  The Appeals Chamber 
stated that the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia did in fact constitute an armed conflict: ‘We find that an 
armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’, see, 
ibid at 70... 
415 Ibid at para 77. 
416 Tadic Appeal, ibid at paras 96-127; Corey, ibid at 152. 
417 Ibid at 98. 
418 Tadic Appeal, ibid at 99; Corey, ibid at 153.  Examples of what the Appeals Chamber detailed in 
evidence are: a statement issued by the DRC during its civil war indicating that Common Article 3 would 
be respected. See, Tadic, ibid at para 105.  The Appeals Chamber also pointed to two GA Resolutions 
concerning the respect for human rights in armed conflict.  See, ibid at para 110. 
419 In fact, the Appeals Chamber actually explicitly mentioned opinio juris in connection with the 
interpretation of Article 2 of the Statute by pointing to an amicus curiae breif of the US: ‘the 'grave 
breaches' provisions of Article 2 of the International Tribunal Statute apply to armed conflicts of a non-
international character as well as those of an international character.’  The Appeals Chamber stated that this 
may be indicative of a possible change in opinio juris.  Ibid, para 83.  However, this assertion did not 
appear to impress upon their Judgment and the Appeals Chamber held that Article 2 only applied to 
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the Judgment susceptible to criticisms of apology.420  In effect, if CIL is to simply reflect 
the practice of states, the law would simply constitute international relations under a 
different guise and the norms pronounced in the text of the Tadic Judgment could not be 
termed legal norms at all.421  
 
Moreover, Meron suggests that the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in 
asserting the existence of state practice was inadequate.422
 
One may ask whether the Tribunal could have made a greater effort to identify 
actual state practice, whether evincing respect for, or violation of, the 
rules…Without some significant discussion of operational practice, it may be 
difficult to persuade governments to accept the Tribunal’s vision of some aspects 
of customary law.423
 
It is arguable that the evidentiary sources relied upon by the Appeals Chamber could not 
be classed as state practice at all. 424   It is noteworthy that the Appeals Chamber 
specifically pointed to the difficulties in ascertaining the practice of states in the realm of 
international criminal law.425  As previously asserted, much of the regulated conduct in 
the realm of international criminal law concerns the military and as such, the only 
possible means of delimiting state practice is through an examination of how states 
respond to individuals who have allegedly breached international criminal norms. 426   
Therefore, the crucial question for the Tribunal, under the traditional bi-partite doctrine, 
should have been: do states prosecute those alleged to have committed breaches of 
international criminal law in internal conflicts? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
international armed conflict.  Ibid para 84.  Moreover, in discussing Article 3 of the Statute there is no 
mention of opinio juris.   
420 Koskenniemi, supra note 7 at 363; Powell & Pillay, supra note 3 at 495; Roberts, supra note 13 at 767. 
421 Koskenniemi, ibid. 
422 Corey, ibid at 154, Meron, supra note 406 at 240 
423 Meron, ibid. 
424 Corey, supra note 412 at 154. 
425 ‘When attempting to ascertain state practice with the view to the establishment of a customary rule or a 
general principle, it is difficult, if not impossible to pinpoint the actual behaviour of troops in the field.’ See 
Tadic Appeal, supra note 410 at para 99; Corey, ibid at 153. 
426 See pg 39. 
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  I would submit that the employment of the re-imagined definition of CIL in the 
Tadic Judgment would have resulted in far more coherent and reasoned argument. 
Perhaps the evidentiary sources referred to by the Tribunal – military manuals, judicial 
decisions and official pronouncements of states – would sit far more comfortably in the 
re-imagined definition of CIL. As the re-imagined definition places its emphasis upon 
normative standards of behaviour, such sources could be determined as evidence of the 
existence of opinio juris. 427  State practice, being merely an epiphenomenal concern, 
would be largely insignificant in the text of the Judgment.  In fact, I submit that the Tadic 
Judgment contained, in the shape of the evidentiary sources it detailed, the building 
blocks for positively asserting the existence of a CIL norm.  However, it is apparent that 
the traditional CIL definition can only provide an unsound foundation for proving rules 
of CIL.  
 
.  How could have the Appeals Chamber asserted the existence of the second 
element of the re-imagined definition of CIL?  Much of the evidence the Appeals 
Chamber could have employed as evidence in asserting the existence of a legitimate 
expectation is actually detailed within the text of the Judgment.  The Appeals Chamber 
detailed relevant GA Resolutions,428 the work of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC)429 and statements of regional organisations.430  However, instead of being 
cast as constituting evidence of a legitimate expectation, such evidence appears to be held 
to amount to state practice.  Over and above the evidence actually detailed by the 
Tribunal, I would point to the Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian 
Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts. 431    
Moreover, the inception of the ICTY itself may be construed as quite concrete evidence 
of the existence of a legitimate expectation.  
 
                                                 
427 See pg 44. 
428 Tadic Appeal, supra note 410 at 110. 
429 Ibid at 108. 
430 Ibid at 113. 
431 The Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts.  Created by the International Institute for Humanitarian Law, San 
Remo, Italy, 1990.  See the International Review of the Red Cross September – October 1990 No. 278 at pg 
404-408. 
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 It is noteworthy that the reasoning within the text of the Tadic Judgment impacted 
upon the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals generally. This is largely due to the fact 
that cases tend to cross-reference each other.  When asserting that customary rules exist 
governing internal armed conflict, Tadic is often referenced. In the Prosecutor –v- Jelisic 
the Trial Chamber stated: 
 
The charges for murder and cruel treatment are based on Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions whose customary status has been noted on several occasions 
by this Tribunal and the Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.432   
 
 
The Trial Chamber then referred to the Akayesu Judgment which confirmed the 
customary status of Common Article 3.433  However, in doing so, the Trial Chamber in 
Akayesu relied upon the reasoning within Tadic.434
 
 The second trend identified within the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals is to 
simply assert the existence of a customary international criminal prohibition.  For present 
purposes, I shall examine the delimitation of the customary international prohibition upon 
genocide.  The Trial Chamber’s Judgment in Akayesu is indicative of the lack of 
empirical enquiry in delimiting CIL norms.435  Within the text of the Judgment the Trial 
Chamber simply states that ‘[t]he Genocide Convention is undeniably considered part of 
CIL.’436 In an attempt to provide some kind of evidence for such a statement, the Trial 
Chamber pointed to an Advisory Opinion of the ICJ and the Report of the Secretary 
General on the establishment of the ICTY.437  There was absolutely no engagement with 
the traditional bi-partite doctrine.  Moreover, it is patently unclear which element of the 
                                                 
432 Prosecutor –v- Jelisic , Case No. IT-95-10-1, 14th December 1999, available at http://www.icty.org . 
last viewed 20th February 2006at 34. The Judgment then referenced the Akayesu Judgment, supra note 411 
at para 608. 
433 See, Akayesu Judgment, ibid at para 608. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid at para 495. 
436 Ibid 
437 Ibid.  See, Report of the Secreatry General Under Security Council Resolution 808, Doc.S/2504. 3rd 
May 1993, reprinted in 14 Hum.Rts.L.J (1993) 198.  The relevant section reads: ‘This body of law 
[humanitarian law] exists in the form of both conventional law and customary law.  While there is 
international customary law which is not laid down in conventions, some of the major conventional 
humanitarian law has become part of customary international law.’ 
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bi-partite doctrine the Trial Chamber is referring to in advancing its two, rather 
inadequate, examples.   
 
Exactly the same reasoning is employed in the Prosecutor –v- Rutaganda. 438   
There was no real empirical enquiry into the existence of a customary prohibition; the 
norm was simply stated to exist. 
 
The Genocide Convention is undeniably part of customary international law, as 
reflected in the advisory opinion issued in 1951 by the International Court of 
Justice on reservations to the Genocide Convention, and as noted by the United 
Nations Secretary General in his Report on the establishment of the International 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.439
 
I would submit that the employment of the re-imagined definition of CIL, in the 
foregoing cases, would have resulted in a clear and concise delimitation of the prohibition 
upon genocide.  There is a veritable wealth of evidentiary sources the Trial Chambers 
could have employed in asserting the existence of a CIL prohibition upon genocide. 
However, I would maintain that the majority of these possible sources would be classed 
as normative.440   It is noteworthy that the enforcement mechanisms of the Genocide 
Convention have long been met with disenchantment and moreover, persistently labelled 
as ineffective.441 Any form of concrete state practice - the prosecution of genocide - 
could not truly be said to exist until the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals.442  How 
could the Trial Chambers, under the re-imagined definition of CIL, prove the existence of 
a customary international prohibition? 
 
                                                 
438 Prosecutor –v- Rutaganda Case No. ICTR-96-3, 6th December 1999 at para 46, available at 
http://www.ictr.org , last viewed 20th February 2006  
439 Ibid. In the Prosecutor –v- Kayishema & Ruzindana Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21st May 1999, available at 
http://www.ictr.org, last viewed 20th February, exactly the same reasoning is one again employed. After 
simply noting the existence of the Nuremberg Tribunal and provisions under the Genocide Convention the 
Trial Chamber stated: ‘[f]urthermore, the crime of Genocide is considered part of customary international 
law and, moreover, a norm of jus cogens.’ Ibid at para 88 
440 The clear exceptions to this are: The Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 382 and the Eichmann case, supra 
note 257. 
441 Cassese, supra note 6 at 97.  
442 Schabas, ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes’’, 1 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2003) 39.  Once again, the exceptions here would be: The Nuremberg 
Tribunal, supra note 382 and the Eichmann case, supra note 257. 
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In asserting the existence of the first element of the re-imagined definition – 
opinio juris – the Trial Chambers could have had recourse to domestic legislation,443 
national judicial decisions 444  and voting patterns at the General Assembly. 445   In 
affirming the existence of the legitimate expectation of the global community of states, 
the second element within the re-imagined definition, the Trial Chambers could had 
recourse to the 1946 General Assembly Resolution of the United Nations. 446  The 
resolution unanimously declared that genocide was an international crime and moreover, 
requested the drafting of a treaty on genocide.447 Furthermore, on the 8th of December 
1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide was unanimously 
adopted.448  It is, once again, arguable that the Trial Chamber could have referred to the 
creation of the ad hoc Tribunals as a clear indication of the existence of a legitimate 
expectation. 
It is arguable, that in the context of genocide, the apparent lack of empirical 
enquiry into the existence of customary prohibition is directly related to the nature of the 
crime itself. Genocide has been described as the ‘the crime of crimes’ 449  and its 
commission, quite correctly, attracts a ‘terrible stigma’.450 Perhaps the existence of a 
customary prohibition is seen as self-evident by the international judiciary.  However, if 
CIL is to constitute a workable legal source of international law, judicial reasoning, 
regardless of how morally distasteful an international crime is seen to be, must do more 
than simply state the existence of a prohibition.   
                                                 
443 An example of such domestic legislation can be found within s 220 of the German Criminal Code. See, 
Strafgesetzbuch mit Erläuterungen (Verlag C.H. Beck: München, 2001) at 831. 
444 The pertinent examples being Eichmann, supra note 254.  Using the German example once again, the 
Trial Chambers could have pointed to: Jorgic, Judgment of 26th September 1997, in 3 Strafrecht 215/98.  
Here. a German Court found the defendant guilty of genocide and sentenced him to life imprisonment.  
See, Cassese, supra note 6 at 97. 
445 GA. Res 96(1) GAOR, Ist Sess., 55th meeting.  U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1. The Resolution was adopted 
unanimously.  See, Shah, ‘The Oversight of the Last Great International Institution of the Twentieth 
Century: The International Criminal Court’s Definition of Genocide’ 16 Emory International Law Review 
(2002) 351 at 354. 
446 GA. Res 96(1), ibid. 
447 Ibid. 
448 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by UN GA on 9th 
October 1948, (1951) 78 UNTS 277There are currently 137 parties to the Genocide Convention see 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty1gen.htm  last viewed 20th Feb 2006. 
449 Prosecutor –v- Kambanda Case No. ICTR – 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 4th September 1998, para 
16, available at http://www.ictr.org , last viewed 20th February 2006. 
450 Schabas, supra note 442 at 9. 
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Careful delimitation of the parameters of customary international criminal law 
norms is essential to facilitate their acceptance and most crucially, their enforcement on 
the international plane.  By examining judicial practice, it is apparent that the traditional 
CIL doctrine is inappropriate for the demands of international criminal enforcement.  
Any definition of CIL should be clear, concise and most importantly, practicable in its 
application.  Judicial practice serves to indicate that as the wealth of international treaty-




























The creation of the ICC has heralded a new era in the enforcement of international crime. 
Effective international criminal enforcement – both domestically and internationally –
seems a real possibility. However, if the patently unsuitable definition of CIL is not re-
cast, the role of customary international criminal law will be at best minimal. An 
examination of the contemporary judicial employment of customary international 
criminal law serves to indicate the need for a novel definition.   
 
Within contemporary judicial practice there is little engagement with the 
traditional bi-partite doctrine.  Moreover, due to definitional frailties, any engagement 
that does occur is inadequate.  Proving a rule of CIL under the traditional definition is an 
impossible task.  In fact, CIL appears to be envisaged as a free-floating concept, whereby 
norms are seen to simply exist within a legal vacuum and materialise on a judicial whim. 
CIL constitutes an ethereal source of law, its existence often forgotten and it is employed, 
more often than not, as an afterthought.  The application of the re-imagined definition 
would resurrect CIL as a concrete source of norm-creation and enable it to function as 
workable legal concept – both practically and theoretically. 
 
International customary law, particularly international customary criminal law, 
should reflect what the law ought to be.  As such, under the re-imagined definition of 
CIL, the reality of international legal relations lies in normativity.  Customary 
international law would no longer reflect what states do.   This does not serve to 
disconnect law from reality. The reality of international legal relations would be that 
states, and individuals, break the law.   The re-imagined definition enables CIL to 
become a tangible source of law in international criminal enforcement. CIL would no 
longer constitute a mere addendum in judicial reasoning. The judiciary – both 
domestically and internationally- would be enabled to undertake empirical enquiries into 
the existence of CIL norms and ultimately, successfully prove the existence of rules of 
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